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impose suit upon the states. It also treats the interpretive functions
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article will discuss questions respecting the kinds of relief that are
available from state defendants.
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To what extent can Congress, through legislation, impose suit
in federal court:' upon the states? The question is easily answered if
one accepts the view of sovereign immunity set forth in the first
Article in this series-that the Constitution allows but does not impose the sovereign immunity doctrine. 2 Congress then would have
full leeway, in the exercise of its regulatory powers, to subject the
states to suit. Since the Supreme Court, however, has accorded constitutional status to the sovereign immunity doctrine,3 the question
of congressional power becomes much more complicated. As the
following discussion will show, the Court seems to have arrived at
much the same solution that a common law sovereign immunity
doctrine would suggest, but the path it has taken is tortuous indeed.
I. THE MAJOR CASES
Questions concerning congressional imposition upon the states
of suits in federal court did not reach the Supreme Court until 1964,
when the Court decided Parden v. Terminal Railway.4 There, as
the Court said, "for the first time . . , a State's claim of immunity
against suit by an individual [met] . . . a suit brought upon a cause

of action expressly created by Congress." 5 Pardenwas a suit against
an Alabama-owned interstate railway by its employees, seeking damages under the Federal Employer's Liability Act 6 [hereinafter
FELA] for personal injuries sustained while employed. The lower
federal courts upheld Alabama's plea of sovereign immunity and
dismissed the suit. 7 The Supreme Court reversed.

The Court held that Congress had intended the terms of the
FELA, covering "[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging
in commerce between any of the several states," 8 to include stateowned railroads. It held that Congress had power thus to make
states suable in federal court for two reasons. First, Congress acted
within its commerce power in regulating interstate railroads, and
"the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
I The different issue that exists for imposition of suit in state court is discussed
in Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 546-49 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Part One].
Throughout this Article, discussion of congressional imposition of suit upon states
refers to suits imposed in federal court.
2 Id. 522-46.
3 Id. 522-24, and authorities cited at 517 n.9.
4377 U.S. 184 (1964).
GId. 187.
6 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
7 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 184
(1964). The district court did not write an opinion, but its order is reproduced in
311 F.2d at 728.
8 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
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granted Congress the power to regulate commerce." 9 Second, the
state consented to suit by beginning to operate an interstate railroad
twenty years after enactment of the FELA regulating such railroads. 10
Three Supreme Court cases since Parden have involved possible
clashes between congressionally-created causes of action and a state
claim of sovereign immunity. The earliest of these, Employees of
the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare [hereinafter, referred to as Government

Employees] 11 most clearly presents the various positions concerning
congressional imposition of suit upon the states. The Government
Employees suit was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act 1
[hereinafter, FLSA] by state employees seeking overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. In rejecting the employees' claims, the Supreme Court distinguished Parden. The
Court held that although Congress had intended to regulate the
wages of state employees like the petitioners, it had not intended to
subject noncompliant states to suits brought by private citizens in
federal court.' 3 The Court held that the Act was not sufficiently
express in subjecting the states to suit for the Court to infer congressional abrogation of the states' immunity. The Court did imply,
however, that if Congress so desired, it could subject the states to
suits like the one at hand.' 4
Both Mr. Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion, 1 and Mr.
Justice Marshall (joined by Mr. Justice Stewart) in an opinion concurring in the result, 16 sharply disputed the Court's conclusion that
Congress had not intended to subject the states to private suit.
Justice Brennan found no difficulty in sustaining the FLSA, thus
construed, because this suit, like Parden, was based upon a regulatory statute founded on the commerce clause, and because the states
"surrender[ed] their immunity to that extent when they granted
Congress the commerce power." 1 (His position, here as elsewhere,
9 377 U.S. at 191.
10 Id. 192-93.
1411 U.S. 279 (1973). The other two, which will be discussed in the text,
infra, are Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976).
12 29 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1970) (amended 1972 & 1974).
13
For other means of enforcing the Act, see text accompanying notes 190-92
infra.
14 See note 58 infra.
15 411 U.S. at 298 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16 Id. 287 (Marshall, J., concurring).
17 Id. 301. See also id. 315.
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was that sovereign immunity is not a constitutionally-based doctrine
in suits, like the present one, brought by a state's own citizens.')
Unlike the Court and Mr. Justice Brennan, however, Mr. Justice
Marshall doubted Congress' power to impose this suit upon the state.
Founding a constitutional doctrine of immunity from federal suit
on article III of the Constitution, 9 Mr. Justice Marshall took the
position that Congress could not abrogate that immunity absent
some real consent to suit on the part of the state. He went on to
say that no such consent could be found on the facts of Government
20
Employees.
Edelman v. Jordan,21 the next major sovereign immunity case,
was a class action against Illinois officials administering programs of
Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD programs), which are
funded equally by the state and federal governments. 22 The plaintiffs in Edelman charged that state officials were withholding welfare
benefits in violation of federal regulations, and the charge was sustained on the merits. The Supreme Court allowed injunctive relief
in Edelman but it also held that the wrongfully withheld benefits
could not be recovered retroactively from the state. One ground on
which the court of appeals had allowed retroactive benefits in
Edelman was that the state had waived its immunity, within the
23
meaning of Parden,by participating in the federal AABD program.
Over four dissents, which included the authors of the Court's
opinions in both Parden and Government Employees, the Supreme
Court reversed, distinguishing Parden on the ground that "in this
case [Edelman] the threshold fact of congressional authorization to
sue a class of defendants which literally includes States is wholly
absent." 24 Accordingly, the Court did not explicitly treat congressional power to impose a damage remedy upon the states.
I8 For a fuller description of Justice Brennan's position, see notes 36-39 infra
& accompanying text.
19 Justice Marshall relied on article III rather than the eleventh amendment
because the case was a citizen suit. See Part One, supra note 1, at 523-24, 537.
20 411 U.S. at 295-97, quoted in text accompanying note 108 infra.
21415 U.S. 651 (1974).
2242 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1970) (replaced by Social Security Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 302, 86 Stat. 1478) (replacement repealed by Social
Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647 § 3(b), 88 Stat. 2349 (1975)).
23 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The court of appeals' opinion was
written prior to the Supreme Court's Government Employees holding.
24415 U.S. at 672. In dissenting opinions, Justice Douglas, id. 678, and
Justice Marshall, id. 688, agreed with the seventh circuit and disputed the Court's
finding that Congress had not intended to authorize suits like Edelman. Both
thought that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorized the suit. Id. 685, 690-92, 693-96 (citing
See also notes 209-11 infra &
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970)).
accompanying text. Justice Marshall, moreover, found here the "voluntary consent"
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Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 25 did address congressional power and upheld a congressional authorization to sue states for damages, enacted
under section five of the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrick was a
suit against the State of Connecticut brought on behalf of all its
male employees, alleging sex-based employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 6 and seeking
money damages as provided by that Act.27 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that Edelman precluded
such an award of money damages, 28 but the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court said that Congress had intended to authorize such
discrimination suits against state governments 29 but that the principal issue concerned congressional power to do so. It found that
power because the congressional legislation in question was enacted
under section five of the fourteenth amendment, an amendment that
was "'intended to be . . . [a limitation] of the power of the States
and [an enlargement] of the power of Congress' "; 80 and because
"the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 81 Two Justices
2
concurred on other grounds.3
to suit that he had found lacking in Government Employees. See text accompanying notes 105-07 infra. Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Marshall's opinion.
Justice Brennan also dissented, on the same ground as he did in Government
Employees, that the states had surrendered their immunity "at least insofar as
[they] . . . granted Congress specifically enumerated powers." Id. 687. Justice
Douglas' dissent rested both on his rejection of Edelman's retroactive monetary
relief rule as an element of the sovereign immunity doctrine, and alternatively, on
a finding of consent on the part of the state.
25427 U.S. 445 (1976).

2642 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -15 (1970), as amended by Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2-B, 10, 11, 13, 86 Stat. 103
(amended 1975 & 1976).
2742 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
28 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 445
(1976). A three-judge district court had held that both a damage award (retroactive retirement benefits) and an award of attorney's fees were precluded. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974). The court of appeals
reversed as to attorney's fees. 519 F.2d at 571-72.
29 This factor distinguished the suit from Edelman. See text accompanying
note 24 supra.
80427 U.S. at 454 (quoting from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
(1880)). The persuasiveness of this reasoning is discussed in text accompanying
notes 133-38, 149-52 infra.
31427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted).
82 Mr. justice Brennan concurred on his usual ground: In citizen suits, sovereign immunity is not a constitutional doctrine and therefore is fully subject to
modification by Congress, acting within its enumerated powers. 427 U.S. at 457-58.
Mr. justice Stevens, concurring separately, 427 U.S. at 458, was uncertain as
to the validity of the Title VII legislation under Congress' fourteenth amendment
powers, but thought that in any event the legislation was valid under the commerce
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As this survey shows, there are two main categories of issues in
the cases-those concerning congressional power to impose the suits
in question, and those concerning interpretation of the congressional
intent. I will discuss the power and the intent issues in turn.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO IMPOSE Surr AND CONCOMITANT
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE NEED FOR STATE CONSENT

One thing to note is that the only opinion in the foregoing
cases that denies congressional power is Mr. Justice Marshall's
opinion in Government Employees.8 3 Justice Marshall found power
to impose federal suit on the states in the other three cases; and all
the other members of the Court have found congressional power
every time they have addressed the issue. The indications are, therefore, that there is congressional power to subject the states to private
federal suits, requiring payment of damages, or other retroactive
benefits, from state funds.
In many ways, the cases are a morass, but one can sort out three
basic positions on congressional power. I will refer to these as the
Brennan position, the Marshall position, and the Court's position.
The first two are much more clearly developed than the last.
One can see in Parden v. Terminal Railway the seeds of the
three basic positions, and also the source of confusion that persists in
the Court's position. The majority opinion in Parden was written
by Mr. Justice Brennan. The status in which the opinion places
congressional regulatory power is ambiguous primarily because of
the two lines of reasoning the Court gives for its result.3 4 The first
reason for giving effect to Congress' regulation of state-owned railroads-that the states, by ratifying the Constitution, surrendered
their immunity from suits imposed by valid congressional enactments-would seem sufficient. The addition, in the next paragraph
of the opinion, of the second reason-that the state consented to suit
when it operated the railroad-confuses the holding, for it is simply
unnecessary if the Court adheres to the first reason. Indeed, that
power. Assuming the applicability of the eleventh amendment, and expressing his
difficulty with the Edelman retroactive monetary relief rule, he found that the
monetary award in this case was distinguishable because it "will not be paid directly
from the state treasury, but rather from two separate and independent pension
funds." Id. 459-60.
33411 U.S. 279, 287 (1973) (Marshall, I., concurring in result).
34 Another significant ambiguity in Parden is its undercutting of the reasoning
of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See text accompanying notes 233-52
infra.
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entire paragraph undermines the preceding rationale; it states also
that the eleventh amendment (which obviously could not have been
waived by ratification of the original Constitution) retains vitality
and that "[ilt remains the law that a State may not be sued by an
individual without its consent." 35 In the cases decided after Parden,
a key issue has been whether the first reason is valid and sufficientwhether Congress can impose suit on states whenever it acts within
its article I or other regulatory powers.
A. The Brennan and Marshall Positions

The position Mr. Justice Brennan has taken consistently since
Pardenis that the first reason is valid, rendering the opinion's second
rationale superfluous. There is no place for a sovereign immunity
claim in a suit by a state's own citizens when Congress, acting within
its regulatory powers, has authorized the suit; by ratifying the Constitution, with its grants of power to Congress, the state consented to
such suits.3 6

Mr. Justice Brennan does concede that the eleventh

amendment may pose a barrier to noncitizen suits,3a and he has gone
so far as to suggest that this barrier should stand despite a state's
consent to suit. 8

(For citizen suits the effect of his position is the

same as if sovereign immunity were recognized as a common law
35 377 U.S. at 192.
S6 Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 300-01, 309-15, 320-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
37See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Eleventh Amendment . . . bars only federal court suits against
States by citizens of other States"); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (inapplicability of eleventh amendment "to suits against a
State brought by its own citizens in federal court"). But see id. 310 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe question whether the Eleventh Amendment constitutionalized
sovereign immunity as to noncitizen suits should . . .be regarded as open, or at
...
); id. 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
least ripe for further consideration.
("I know of no concrete evidence that the framers of the [Eleventh] Amendment
thought, let alone intended, that even the Amendment would ensconce the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.").
3sEmployees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The literal wording
[of the eleventh amendment] is - . .a flat prohibition against the federal judiciary's
entertainment of suits against even a consenting State brought by citizens of another
State or by aliens.").
The Court has not agreed with Justice Brennan's suggestion that where a constitutional requirement of sovereign immunity exists, a state cannot waive its immunity and thus effectively expand the federal "judicial power." See, e.g., Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
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doctrine, without constitutional sanction, as Justice Brennan recognizes. 39)
Mr. Justice Marshall, on the other hand, has not regarded the
first reason of Parden as sufficient or persuasive and has taken seriously the requirement that a state must consent to avoid either an
article III or an eleventh amendment bar to suit. "Consent" by
ratification of the Constitution is not sufficient; instead, Mr. Justice
Marshall sees state immunity from federal suit as a constitutionallyrequired doctrine in both citizen and noncitizen suits.4 0 Nor can
the required consent be wholly fictional. Not only did Mr. Justice
Marshall find no consent on the facts of Government Employees; 4
he also suggested in that opinion that if he had the question to decide afresh, he might not find that Alabama, by operating a railroad
after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to suit.2
Mr. Justice Marshall did find consent in Edelman, however,
because the welfare program there involved was "fundamentally different from most federal legislation"; it was not imposed upon the
states, but gave states the option to participate. 43 If they decided to
participate, they would receive federal matching funds; and their
undertaking in return to comply with federal requirements could
Moreover, "[i]n agreeing to comply,"
be considered voluntary.
Mr. Justice Marshall reasoned, a state "also agreed to subject itself
to suit in the federal courts to enforce these obligations." 45
My evaluation of the foregoing positions is largely evident from
the first Article in this series. Like Mr. Justice Brennan, that Article
supports a common law concept of sovereign immunity, although it
goes beyond his position by extending that concept to noncitizen
39
E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
("nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity"); Employees of
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 320 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("traditional nonconstitutional
principles of sovereign immunity"); id. 321 ("ancient principles of sovereign

immnunity").

40 According to Mr. Justice Marshall, both article HI and the eleventh amendment impose sovereign immunity; article RI's provision applies to citizens' suits as
well as noncitizens' suits. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Stewart, J., concurring in result).
41 See text accompanying note 20 supra and text accompanying note 108 infra.
42 "For me at least, the concept of implied consent or waiver relied upon in
Parden approaches, on the facts of that case, the outer limit of the sort of voluntary
choice which we generally associate with the concept of constitutional waiver."
411 U.S. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring in result). The statement is quoted in
context in text accompanying note 108 infra.
43 415 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 Id. 689.
45 Id. 690. See also id. 695-96.
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suits. 4 6 Once Mr. Justice Brennan finds that the sovereign immunity
doctrine is not constitutionally required, congressional power to
impose suit follows. Similarly, Mr. Justice Marshall's position on
congressional power flows naturally from his interpretation of sovereign immunity as a constitutionally-imposed limit on the judicial
power that can be abrogated only by a state's consent. My quarrel
with Mr. Justice Marshall's position is only with this concept of
sovereign immunity: Neither constitutional language nor history
supports the view that article III imposes a doctrine of state sov47
ereign immunity from federal suit.
B. The Court's Position on Congressional Power
1. The Essential Ambiguity in the Court's Position-Its Endorsement
of Both Congressional Power and the Need for State Consent
In contrast to the relative clarity of the Brennan and Marshall
positions on congressional imposition, the Court's position is difficult
to decipher.48 The most basic problem is that the Court seems to
endorse both Congress' power to impose suit and the necessity for
state consent to suit. The confusion in the Court's position can be
seen as the confusion of Parden-anambiguity as to which of the
Parden lines of reasoning it adopts. Since Parden, the Court has
not described the states' grant of regulatory power to Congress as a
waiver. In that sense, it has not followed the first prong of Parden's
reasoning.49 But in a different way, its position seems equivalent to
Parden's first rationale, standing alone. The Court's implications

that Congress is free to impose suit upon the states as long as it stays
within its article I and other regulatory powers suggest that sov-

ereign immunity is only a common law doctrine.

If sovereign im-

munity had constitutional status, how could Congress abrogate it?

50

46
Mr. Justice Brennan also recognizes the possibility that the concept would
extend to noncitizen suits. See note 37 supra.
Justice Marshall does not see the
47 See Part One, supra note 1, at 527-38.
eleventh amendment as supporting immunity in these cases because of the amendment's limitation to noncitizen suits.
48 One reason, of course, is that the various opinions of "the Court" are authored
by different Justices, some of whom have quite individual views on sovereign immunity. Yet the Court's opinions purport to be consistent, and it seems useful to
attempt to elucidate the position in which they leave the congressional imposition
question, since that position is presently "the law."
4
9 Justice Brennan, the author of Parden, has continued to follow that opinion's
first rationale. See notes 24 and 32 and text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
50 It is no answer to say that both the eleventh amendment and article III are
phrased as limitations on the "judicial power" and not on the power of Congress.
For Congress is not allowed, in other instances, to confer on the federal courts
jurisdiction of cases outside the United States' "judicial power." See note 258
infra & accompanying text.
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The Court's position, as expressed in Government Employees
and Edelman, appears to differ from Mr. Justice Brennan's because
the Court emphasizes the search for a federal statute authorizing the
particular action, while Mr. Justice Brennan stresses the states' consent to suit, given by ratification of the Constitution.5 ' But the
theories are actually the same in this respect, for even under the
Brennan scheme, suit will not be imposed upon the states unless
there is a congressional enactment imposing it; and finding a statute
under the Court's scheme would not avail unless that statute were
52
constitutional.
Like Mr. Justice Brennan, the Court sometimes talks in language of consent, rather than in language of congressional imposition. But here its theory does depart from Mr. Justice Brennan's,
because the consent on the part of a state that the Court looks to is
not a consent accompanying ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, it hardly could be since the primary source of sovereign immunity, according to the Court, is the eleventh amendment 5 3-a
post-ratification amendment. Moreover, unlike Mr. Justice Brennan,
the Court appears to view sovereign immunity as a constitutionallyrequired doctrine.54 In these respects, then, the Court's position
seems to resemble Mr. Justice Marshall's-or the second Parden
rationale-more than Mr. Justice Brennan's position. But the question remains, if immunity from federal suit is a constitutionally
imposed doctrine, where does Congress derive the power to impose
suit upon the state? r5 The key to the Court's position on this issue
lies in the interrelationship it creates between consent to suit and
congressional imposition of suit.
51 Thus, in Government Employees, Justice Brennan objected to the Court's
"inquiry 'whether Congress has brought the States to heel, in the sense of lifting
their immunity from suit in a federal court,' since Parden held that, because of its
surrender, no immunity exists that can be the subject of a congressional declaration
or a voluntary waiver." 411 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
52 The theories seem the same, that is, with respect to congressional power.
They may differ nonetheless concerning presumptions of congressional intent to
impose suit. See text accompanying notes 175-232 infra.
53 Despite the eleventh amendments language, this is true even for suits by a
state's own citizens. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1973); Employees of
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 284 (1973). See Part One, supra note 1, at 522.
54 Part One, supra note 1, at 522. See id. 517 n.9, 524 n.38, 548 n.113.
55 Neither Mr. Justice Brennan nor Mr. Justice Marshall ultimately has this
difficulty: Mr. Justice Brennan, because he finds sovereign immunity is not a constitutional doctrine; Mr. Justice Marshall, because he finds that Congress cannot
impose suit.
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2. The Court's View of the Interrelationship Between Congressional
Power and State Consent
For the moment, I will put to the side the question of congressional power under the Civil War amendments, which may be a
distinct source of congressional power, with its own special analysis.
Cases prior to Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 56 did not deal with that power
but with article I powers of Congress. Seemingly the Court found
that Congress, under its article I powers, had authority to impose
upon the states an obligation to defend suits by private individuals
in federal court.
As the Pardendiscussion above discloses, 57 the Court seems both
to uphold congressional power to subject states to suit and to maintain the need for states' consent. In Government Employees, too,
the Court said Congress had power to impose suit,5s but also that
"a federal court is not competent to render judgment against a nonconsenting State." 59 It can be crucial which of these propositions
is in fact determinative. If, for example, Congress enacts a statute
allowing individuals a right of action against the states in federal
court, is that statute valid regardless of states' consent to suit? It
would seem not to be if consent is required; otherwise it would be
valid.
These two conflicting themes in the Court's position are reconciled by its practice of consistently imputing to the states a fictional
consent whenever it finds that Congress has imposed suit. If consent
is always present when Congress regulates a particular area, it matters little whether one calls that consent required or not: in either
case, the regulation is valid. For that reason the Court's position
becomes the equivalent of Mr. Justice Brennan's in practice. (Indeed, its results bring it even closer to the position I advocate-that
sovereign immunity should be deemed solely a common law doctrine
-than to Mr. Justice Brennan's position, insofar as he would accord
constitutional status to sovereign immunity in noncitizen suits.) In
theory, however, it. resembles more the position of Mr. Justice Mar56427 U.S. 445 (1976).
57
See text accompanying notes 9-10, 34-35 supra.
58 411 U.S. at 284 ("Where employees in state institutions not conducted for
profit have such a relation to interstate commerce that national policy, of which

Congress is the keeper, indicates that their status should be raised, Congress can
act. And when Congress does act, it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States."); id. 283 ("The question is whether Congress has brought the
States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal
court....").

See also id. 287 ("[T]he purpose of Congress to give force to the

Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States . . .is not clear.").
59 411 U.S. at 284.

See also id. 280.
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shall, both because it sees sovereign immunity as a constitutional
requirement, and because it requires states to consent other than by
ratifying the Constitution.
The Court's method of finding consent is evident from Parden.
Believing that Congress had imposed "a condition of amenability to
suit upon the State's right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce," 1o the Court there said:
Where a State's consent to suit is alleged to arise from an
act not wholly within its own sphere of authority but
within a sphere-whether it be interstate compacts or interstate commerce-subject to the constitutional power of the
Federal Government, the question whether the State's act
constitutes the alleged consent is one of federal law..
[When a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own
and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to the regulation as fully as if it were
a private person or corporation. 61
In other words, states' consent would be inferred whenever the
federal statute in question is interpreted to impose the condition of
waiver of immunity, independent of any question of state intent to
consent to suit. The theory is that when a state begins or continues
to operate in an area that Congress has validly regulated (or conditioned, under the spending power) by imposing suit, it thereby
consents to be sued, and this makes the only issue whether the statute
does impose suit.
Edelman runs together the issues of state consent and of congressional power in the same way. The Court's opinion contains
some language that might be deemed to suggest a change of course,
for it disapproves constructive consent,6 2 and says that
[i]n deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional
protection under the Eleventh Amendment, [the Court]
. . . will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
6o Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. at 193 n.11. Later, as well, the Court
described the case as one "where the waiver is asserted to arise from the State's
commission of an act to which Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional power
to regulate commerce, has attached the condition of amenability to suit." Id. 195.
61Id. 196.

60 2 "Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here."

415 U.S. at 673.
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Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.

151, 171 (1909).63

Nonetheless the Court does not step back from its earlier position,
but reaffirms it. It says that Edelman is unlike Pardenand Government Employees, because both of those cases "involved a congressional enactment which by its terms authorized suit by designated
plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities." 6 In Edelman, by contrast,
"the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of
defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent." 05
Where Congress has not imposed suit, the Court will require the
genuine state consent it describes above 66 and the "mere fact" of
state participation in the welfare program was insufficient. 67 But
when Congress has imposed suit, the Court does not question the
doctrine it finds in earlier cases that "[t]he question of waiver or
consent under the Eleventh Amendment . . . turn[s] on whether
Congress . . . intended to abrogate the immunity in question, and

whether the State by its participation in the program authorized
by Congress .
immunity." 68

.

. in effect consented to the abrogation of that

The Court's practice of imputing consent from states' activities
in areas covered by congressional enactments rests, then, essentially
on a theory that Congress has conditioned the grant of some privilege
or benefit to the state 69 upon the state's waiver of its sovereign immunity. One might object to this approach generally on the ground
that grants of federal benefits or privileges to states should not be
70
conditioned upon states' forfeiture of their constitutional rights.
The Court added:
We see no reason to retreat from the Court's statement in Great Northern
631d.

Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S., at 54 (footnote omitted):
"[W]hen we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial

interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other
courts than those of its own creation must be found."

Id.
64

Id. 672.

65 Id.
66 See notes 62 & 63 supra & accompanying text. See also notes 92-94 infra
& accompanying text.
67 415 U.S. at 673.
68 Id. 672.
0
9 For example, Pardeninvolved the privilege of operating a railroad; Edelman,
the benefit of federal money for welfare programs.
70 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 570-71 (1898);
See
Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1893).
generally French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234

(1961).
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The nexus between the privilege granted and the demanded waiver
may, however, be sufficient to save it from invalidation as an unconstitutional condition; it may be legitimate to demand the waiver
because it is the grant of the privilege that created the need for the
waiver. 71 In Parden and Edelman the question whether the states
had consented to suit could thus become the equivalent of whether
Congress had imposed suit on the states.
It is much more difficult to explain in that way the Court's assertions of congressional power to subject states to suit in Government Employees. The difficulty is that the statutory scheme involved
in Government Employees granted no "privilege" to the states. The
congressional regulation consisted of imposing specified minimum
wages for certain state employees. Perhaps "engaging in interstate
commerce" could be deemed the privilege that Congress bestowed,
at least insofar as the FLSA applies to employers generally. But
this privilege should not support the Act's application to states, for
states could not operate at all without being "in interstate commerce" as that term is currently defined by the Court. 72 Similarly,
the state could not operate without having employees-although
school and hospital employees may not be an absolute necessity.
One would imagine that there are at least some activities that Congress cannot forbid states to engage in; the list might include, for
example, running the legislature or courts; maintaining a state
house; or engaging in police work or fire prevention.7 3 If it is true
that Congress cannot forbid certain activities to the states, it is dif4
ficult to understand how it can condition those activities 7 upon a
71 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44
But cf. Lefkowitz
(1947). But see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
v. Cunningham, 97 S. Ct 2132 (1977) (State may not condition holding of state

political office upon waiver of ffth amendment right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination).
72
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
73 Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (some essential
state activities exempt from congressional regulation under the commerce power),
discussed in text accompanying notes 78-90 infra.
74 Justice Marshall made the same point in his dissenting opinion in Edelman
where he said,
if sovereign immunity is to be at all meaningful, the Court must be reluctant to hold a State to have waived its immunity simply by acting in its
sovereign capacity-i.e. by merely performing "governmental" functions.
On the other hand, in launching a profitmalcing enterprise, "a State leaves
the sphere that is exclusively its own," Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377
U.S., at 196, and a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity can more
easily be found.
415 U.S. at 695.
Mr. Justice Marshall attributes this point to the Court's opinion in Government
Employees. The Court there did not, however, suggest that the governmental-
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waiver of a constitutional right of immunity.7 5
This analysis would suggest that there may be limits to the
Court's ability to impute a fictional consent to the states.7 While
imputed consent in Parden and Edelman resolved the conflict between congressional power to subject states to suit and the states'
constitutional right to immunity, congressional power to impose
suit might not exist when consent cannot be imputed. Perhaps if
the Government Employees holding had rested upon congressional
power, the Court would have developed its argument, discovered
the difficulties of inferring state consent on the facts of the case, and
decided on another basis whether congressional power, or the need
for state consent, would prevail. Nonetheless, Government Employees as it stands plainly implies that the Court was ready to impute state consent to suit if Congress had intended to impose suit,
and that the only bar to suability was that Congress had not chosen
to impose any condition of waiver. The Court quite clearly says
that Congress has power to impose the waiver of suit upon the state
77
for the program there at issue.
Government Employees suggests, therefore, that consent will
always be imputed to states if Congress, in a valid enactment, has
imposed suit upon them. But one cannot be certain that the Court
has chosen this course, because its holding in Government Employees did not rest upon the finding of congressional power, and
because the Court did not thoroughly develop its finding that congressional power existed.
C. The Significance of National League of Cities v. Usery
The issue whether the Court will impute consent to suit even
from states engaging in activities that are essential to their operation
as states has to some extent been mooted. NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery,7 8 decided three years after Government Employees, again
involved the congressional regulation of the minimum wages and
proprietary distinction 'it discussed was relevant to assessing the voluntariness of

waiver by states or any issue of congressional power; its discussion of the governmental-proprietary distinction relates instead to the question of congressional intent
to subject states to suit. See 411 U.S. at 284-85.
75 Sometimes Congress can forbid an activity without being able to condition
it. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949); Hanover Fire
Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926); Frost & Frost Trucking v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). The converse does not follow.
76 Thus the fourth circuit, in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. North
Carolina Ports Auth., 511 F.2d 1007, 1008 (4th Cir. 1975), apparently limited
Pardenes constructive consent approach to proprietary state activities.
77 See note 58 supra.
78426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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overtime pay of state employees embodied in the FLSA. 79 Prior to
Government Employees, the Court had upheld the constitutionality
of these regulations in Maryland v. Wirtz.80 At the time Wirtz was
decided, the Court's view of the commerce power permitted Congress to regulate state activities whenever it could regulate similar
activities of private persons-that is, whenever regulation might
rationally be deemed substantially to affect interstate commerce.Si
Usery, however, overruled Wirtz and held that the FLSA regulations
were an invalid impingement upon the states' sovereignty, which is
protected by the tenth amendment to the Constitution.32 According
79
The 1974 amendments stated expressly that Congress intended to make state
employers, along with other employers, subject to private enforcement actions.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 61
(amending 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1970)).
The 1974 amendments had also further expanded the coverage of the Act.
They expressly included "public agencies," 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. IV 1974),
and they brought almost all public employees within the Act (for the exceptions
that remained, see 29 U.S.C. §§203(e)(2)(C), 213(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974)). In
Usery the Court emphasized that the amended Act covered persons employed by
fire, police, and health departments, and sanitation districts, as well as the school
and hospital employees involved in Government Employees. See 426 U.S. at 851.
That the Usery Court did not intend to confine its holding to these arguably more
essential government activities is apparent, however, from its overruling of Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which, like Government Employees, concerned
school and hospital workers. See 426 U.S. at 853-55.
80 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The regulations were, however, in somewhat different
form. See note 79 supra.
81 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
82 See 426 U.S. at 842-43. If the holding is deemed to derive directly from
the tenth amendment, it is difficult to square with that amendments wording. The
amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. That wording would seem to support
the view of the tenth amendment prevailing before Usery, that it "states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), and that its content can be determined only by examining the Constitution's delegations of power to the federal government. Under this
traditional approach, if something is within the commerce power, or any other
federal power, the tenth amendment necessarily does not reserve it to the states.
Usery clearly altered this approach, if it is a tenth amendment case, because it
considered the FLSA provisions to be prima facie within the reach of the commerce
power, and valid as applied to private employers, but it nevertheless held that the
provisions "encounter a . . . constitutional barrier because they are to be applied
directly to the States as employers." 426 U.S. at 841 (footnote omitted).
It is not absolutely clear, from the Court's opinion, whether the Usery holding
did rest upon the tenth amendment, as distinct from other policies of federalism
(not tied to any particular constitutional provision). Some of the Court's statements
indicate that it is a tenth amendment case. For example, the Court says, "there are
limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising
its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce" and "an express
declaration of this limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment." Id. 842-43.
Moreover, the Court had foreshadowed this apparent approach of finding affirmative
limits in the tenth amendment in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See
also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).
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to Usery, there are some-subjects so central to the state governments
that Congress cannot reach them even if they are otherwise within
Congress' regulatory powers, and among those subjects are the wages
and hours of state employees.
The Usery holding goes beyond the suggestion, discussed
above, 3 that state consent to suit under the FLSA should not be
inferred from the state engaging in interstate commerce and employing school and hospital employees. For Usery is not limited to
protecting the states' immunity from federal suit. Instead it prohibits the congressional regulation altogether.84 No Justice in
Government Employees had questioned the validity of the congressional regulation there, although Justice Douglas, the author of
Government Employees, was a dissenter in Wirtz. 5
It is not at all clear how broadly Usery will apply. The Usery
opinion contains many formulations describing the area into which
Congress may not intrude, 6 but none furnishes definitive guidance.
83

See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
84 Mr. Justice Marshall dissented in Usery. Even if he did stand behind the
governmental-proprietary distinction he put forth in Government Employees, therefore, see notes 102-03 infra & accompanying text, the Court's response in Usery
to the concern he articulated was more forceful than Mr. Justice Marshall wished.
Justice Marshall in Government Employees made clear that congressional regulation
of states was appropriate in any article I area (or other area within congressional
regulatory power, e.g., section 5 of the fourteenth amendment), and that he questioned only the availability of the federal forum to enforce that regulation. -411
U.S. at 297-98. See Part One, supra note 1, at 546-49.
In one respect, however, the Usery rule might possibly go less far than Mr.
Justice Marshall's suggestion. It probably does not extend to all things that could
be deemed "governmentar' as that phrase has been used in other contexts, see
notes 86-89 infra & accompanying text, and conceivably it extends to fewer
subjects than Mr. Justice Marshall's distinction does. For the various formulations
the Usery Court used, see note 86 infra.
85 Wirtz was a 6-2 decision. Mr. Justice Stewart joined in Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion. Mr. Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision.
86 For example, the Usery opinion says "there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress," 426
U.S. at 845. It describes those attributes at various places as "essential governmental functions," id. 839; "essential governmental decisions," id. 850; "the activities
of the States as States," id. 842. See also id. 845; "'essentially and peculiarly
state powers,"' id. 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911));
"'functions essential to [the state's] separate and independent existence,'" id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 580); and "attribute[s] of state sovereignty," id.
Usery defines the functions on which Congress may not intrude in many different ways, for example: "activities . . . typical of those performed by state and
local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services," id. 851; "functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which States have traditionally
afforded their citizens," id.; "those governmental services which the States and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens," id. 855. It further
says that Congress cannot displace "state policies regarding the manner in which
they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens, require," id. 847; "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs States'
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It may be that Usery applies only "when Congress seeks to regulate
directly the activities of States as public employers." s1 Indeed the
protected area may be narrower still; Isit may be limited to federal
regulation of state employees' wages and hours, so that the federal
government could constitutionally impose a health regulation that
would apply in all places of employment, private or public. Moreover, the legislation in Usery was enacted under Congress' commerce
power and, as Usery recognized, the same subjects that are protected
from congressional regulation there may be reachable under other
congressional powers.89
The upshot is that today there exists an area of state activity
that, because it is central to the states' functioning as states, is beyond congressional regulation under the commerce clause and perhaps other congressional powers. Although the scope of the area is
still uncertain, it at least covers the factual situation in Government
Employees. That area has been put beyond the reach of congressional regulation altogether. When a challenged regulation impinges upon that area, the Court need not determine whether states
constructively consent to suit by engaging in even essential governmental activities; nor need the Court resolve whether a congressional
requirement that states consent to suit in order to continue operations is an "unconstitutional condition."
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system," id. 843 (quoting
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)); Congress cannot "interfere
with traditional aspects of state sovereignty" or "substantially restructure traditional
ways in which local governments have arranged their affairs." 426 U.S. at 849.
It cannot "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions:' id.852; it cannot "force directly upon
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
government functions are to be made," id.855.
87 426 U.S. at 841.
88
In Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977),
appeal pending, No. 77-1846 (5th Cir., oral argument scheduled for June, 1978),
the district court held that the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C.
§§2021-2026 (Supp. V 1975), had required the Florida Department of Transportation to grant the plaintiff a military leave of absence, so that upon his return
from military duty he was entitled to reemployment with seniority, status, and
salary, as if he had never been absent. The state argued that the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, thus applied, "impairs states' integrity" within the meaning
of Usery, because it "effectively disrupts the States' authority to control state employees with respect to conditions of employment," id. 458; but the court rejected
that contention. Although the state has appealed Peers eleventh amendment holdings, see notes 154, 169 & 287 infra, it has not appealed this limitation of Usery.
For other opinions interpreting Usery narrowly, see Usery v. Allegheny County
Institution Dist, 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976); National League of Cities v.
Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1977) (Supreme Court Usery on remand).

89National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976).
notes 146-47 infra & accompanying text.

See
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Those questions persist, however, insofar as some essential
governmental services can still be regulated by Congress, under the
commerce power and under other powers. In those governmental
areas where congressional regulation is not forbidden, can Congress
impose suit upon the states, or must the states first consent to suit?
If consent is required, will the Court, as Government Employees
suggests, find a fictional consent whenever Congress has imposed
suit, despite the difficulty of inferring consent from states engaging
in essential governmental services? Or will it develop, another approach delimiting the circumstances in which consent can be. inferred? 90

D. Alternative Approaches to Determining Consent
If the Court does prove unwilling to impute consent from state
operation of essential governmental services, what degree of voluntariness will be necessary in those cases for consent to suit to be
attributed to states?
Supreme Court cases cover a broad spectrum on the question
how genuine a state's consent to suit must be to effectuate a valid
waiver. There is a category of cases that requires genuine state
waiver of immunity as a precondition to private, federal suits against
states.9 1 In those cases the Court says that the interpretation of a
state statute waiving immunity is a question of state law,9 2 and it
even resolves ambiguities in state consent statutes against a waiver
of federal court immunity.9 3 This requirement of genuine consent
applies, however, only to suits that no federal enactment purports to
authorize.9 4 Those cases stand in sharp contrast to the constructive
consent approach the Court follows in cases involving congressional
imposition of suit upon the states. Pardenv. Terminal Railway was
one of the first cases following this constructive approach. 95 There
the Court found state consent even though Alabama at no time had
90 For discussion of the effect of Usery on other sovereign immunity issues,' see
text accompanying notes 144-52, 159-61, 220-24 infra.

91 See notes 62-63 supra & accompanying text.

The cases predate Parden,

and prior to Edelman, see text accompanying notes 63-68 supra, one might have

thought that Parden superseded them.
92 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 495 (1945); Southern
Ry. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 246 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
93 E.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577
(1946).
94
5See Parden v. Terminal By., 377 U.S. at 195-96. See also text accompanying

notes 63-68 supra.
95 The other was Petty v. Missouri-Tennessee Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
(1959), in which the Court held that the states involved had waived their immunity
when they entered into an interstate compact, approved by Congress on -the condition that nothing therein should diminish federal jurisdiction.

IMPOSITION OF SUIT UPON THE STATES

1223

intended to waive immunity. Nor did state officials even know,
until the Supreme Court so informed them, that a waiver had taken
place.9 For the Alabama Constitution at all times had provided
that the state could "never be made a defendant in any court of law
or equity," 9' and state case law had denied the power of either the
state legislature or any state officer to waive the state's immunity. 98
Mr. Justice Marshall has attempted to develop an alternative
approach, more meaningful than the Court's, to determine states'
consent to congressionally imposed suits. The position he develops
falls, on the voluntary-constructive spectrum, somewhere in between
those cases requiring genuine consent and those suggesting a willingness to impute consent automatically whenever a congressional enactment imposes suit. Justice Marshall did not agree that state
consent could be found in Government Employees, although the
Court there implied that its constructive consent approach would
obtain and that Congress had power to impose suit upon the states.
On the other hand, he did find state consent in Parden and in
Edelman. One or more of the factors he discusses, in his separate
opinions in Government Employees and Edelman,9 might possibly prove useful to the Court if indeed it finds itself unwilling
automatically to impute consent in some instances.
In Edelman, Mr. Justice Marshall made the point already discussed above: "[T]he Court must be reluctant to hold a State to have
waived its immunity simply by acting in its sovereign capacity-i.e.,
by merely performing its 'governmental' functions." 100 He did not
believe, however, that this necessarily barred a finding of state consent to suit for governmental activities, and it did not in Edelman:
"While conducting an assistance program for the needy is surely a
'governmental' function, the State here has done far more than
operate its own program in its sovereign capacity." 101
9 This fact substantially weakens any attempted reconciliation of Parden with
later cases on the ground that the state in Parden "had notice that it was entering
a regulated industry subject to federally imposed liabilities." Nowak, The Scope
of Congressional Power To Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 CoLum. L. lEv. 1413,
1450 (1975). In discussing Edelman, by contrast, Professor Nowak says that "although Illinois had notice when it entered the program that it would have to follow
federal guidelines or lose its funds, it had no notice from Congress that failure to
follow these regulations would result in liability to its citizens." Id. 1452. The
point is as applicable to Parden as it is to Edelman.
97 ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. I, § 14.
9SParden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. at 194 & n.12 (citing Alabama cases).
99 Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. at 287 (concurring in result); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at
688 (dissenting).
100 415 U.S. at 695. See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
101 415 U.S. at 695.
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It is not clear whether Mr. Justice Marshall himself intended to
espouse the "governmental-proprietary" distinction that he describes
in Edelman, or whether he simply (erroneously)

102

attributes it to

the Court.10 3 In any event, it does make sense, as discussed above, 104
to refuse to impute state consent simply from states engaging in
activities that Congress could not forbid to them.
A second relevant factor appears in Edelman, where Mr. Justice
Marshall stressed that the state truly had an option whether to join
in the federal program. 10 5 A related way to sustain the voluntariness
of the consent in Edelman is to stress that the state benefited from
subjecting itself to federal regulation because, as a result, it received
federal matching funds. There should be more willingness to view
the state's consent as voluntary when it is given as part of a bar0 -when the state derives some benefit in return for its
gain 1°
07
waiver.
10 2 See note 74 supra. The Court seemingly employed the governmentalproprietary distinction in relation to how dearly congressional imposition of suit
must be expressed. 411 U.S. at 284-85. See text accompanying notes 200-02 infra.
Justice Brennan read the Court's distinction thus, although he questioned its
relevance to the issue. 411 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10i In Government Employees Mr. Justice Marshall roundly repudiated any
governmental-proprietary distinction in this area:
Certainly, I do not accept the Court's efforts to distinguish this case from
Parden on the basis that there we dealt with a "proprietary" function,
whereas here we deal with a "governmental" function. . . . I had
thought we had escaped such unenlightening characterizations of States'
activities. Cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968); United
States v. California,297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1936).
411 U.S. at 297 n.11. In Edelman, however, he picks up the distinction, which he
attributes to the Court, and gives it a rationale that makes it applicable to assessing
voluntariness of waiver, an issue to which the Court had not suggested its distinction
was relevant. See note 74 supra. And even in Government Employees, in arguing
that consent should not be imputed, he made mention of the fact that the state
activities at issue were "vital public services." See text accompanying note 108
infra.
104 See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
105 415 U.S. at 688-90, 693, 695-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
One might
question whether states today could realistically opt to renounce federal welfare
funds. Nonetheless since formally states have the option, and since they benefit
from the funds, it is reasonable to hold them to conditions imposed upon the funds.
106 That the waiving party has benefited from the waiver might profitably be
given some weight in the troublesome confessions area, as well. Perhaps one
reason the voluntariness of guilty pleas has been made so much more difficult to
challenge than that of confessions, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970), is because the defendant in a guilty plea situation usually has benefited
to some degree from his plea.
107 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
This rationale for upholding states' consent would be particularly helpful in sustaining exercises of Congress' spending power.
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The main factor Justice Marshall stressed in refusing to find
state consent in Government Employees was timing:
In Parden v. Terminal R. Co., supra, this Court found
that Alabama which had undertaken the operation of an
interstate railroad had consented to suits brought in federal
court by its railroad employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. As to the State's
suability in federal court, the Court reasoned that "Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad
approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act."
377 U.S., at 192. For me at least, the concept of implied
consent or waiver relied upon in Parden approaches, on the
facts of that case, the outer limit of the sort of voluntary
choice which we generally associate with the concept of
constitutional waiver. Cf. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-186 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 439 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Certainly, the concept cannot be stretched sufficiently further to encompass this case. Here the State was fully engaged in the operation of the affected hospitals and schools
at the time of the 1966 amendments. To suggest that the
State had the choice of either ceasing operation of these
vital public services or "consenting" to federal suit suffices,
I believe, to demonstrate that the State had no true choice
at all and thereby that the State did not voluntarily consent
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. Cf.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1968).

In

Parden, Alabama entered the interstate railroad business
with at least legal notice of an operator's responsibilities
and liability under the FELA to suit in federal court, and
it could have chosen not to enter at all if it considered that
liability too onerous or offensive. It obviously is a far different thing to say that a State must give up established
facilities, services, and programs or else consent to federal
suit. Thus, I conclude that the State has not voluntarily
consented to the exercise of federal judicial power over it
08
in the context of this case.
Justice Marshall's distinction between Pardenand Government
Employees suggests that for consent to be genuine, the state may
have to commence the regulated activity after Congress has imposed
108 411 U.S. at

295-97.
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the regulation.1 0 9 If this distinction were adopted, 10 one can
imagine problems of application. For example, how would Mr.
Justice Marshall resolve the question if, subsequent to the state's
"consent," Congress imposed a distinctly more stringent regulation
of the same subject matter? I" Would he say that consent to regulation of the particular subject matter necessarily encompasses every
valid congressional regulation for all time; or would Congress, in
altering the regulatory scheme, risk losing the state's consent? A
converse problem would arise if the state's entry into the field-for
example, railroads-preceded the congressional regulation, but subsequent to the regulation the state expanded its enterprise.
Another issue is how this suggestion that the date of regulation
is dispositive would fit in with the "governmental-proprietary" distinction for determining voluntariness of consent. One possibility
would be a rule that consent can always be found when a state
engages in proprietary activities, 112 but that for governmental activities it can be inferred only if the regulation preceded commencement of the activity. Otherwise the rule could be that consent can
never be inferred for governmental activities (though of course
genuine state consent would be honored here as elsewhere), and that

109 The extent to which Mr. Justice Marshall would adhere to this distinction is
unclear. Not only does justice Marshall's opinion in Government Employees throw
his Parden position into some doubt, see text accompanying note 42 supra; but, in
a footnote appearing at the end of the above-quoted Government Employees language on consent, Justice Marshall also declines to commit himself as to whether he
would find consent in Government Employees if the state had begun to operate the
relevant facilities after the congressional regulations were in effect. 411 U.S. at
279 n.11.
11o The Court apparently does not espouse the distinction, but instead believes
that consent could be imputed on the facts of Government Employees even if
state participation in the activity predated congressional regulation. See note 58
supra and text accompanying note 77 supra.
"'The problem would not arise, of course, in spending power cases like
Edelman, involving conditions attached to receipt of federal funds; in those cases,
when the conditions changed, a state could simply cease to participate and cease
to receive federal benefits. In other contexts, however, the problem is a real one.
In commerce clause cases like Parden, for example, the state would be put to a
choice similar to the one Justice Marshall describes above, see text accompanying
note 108 supra,-a choice between ceasing operation of its railroad or "consenting"
to the new regulation.
212 This is the equivalent of a rule that the eleventh amendment protects
states only in their governmental activities. The Government Employees Court can
be read, at one point, to say the amendment has no application to proprietary
activities. 411 U.S. at 284 (saying the eleventh amendment bars suit against nonconsenting states but distinguishing Parden because it involved an activity "operated
for profit" and "in an area where private persons and corporations normally ran the
enterprise.").
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it would be inferred for proprietary activities only if entry was subsequent to regulation.1 3 '
E. Summary of Pre-Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer Law on Congressional
Power To Abrogate States' Immunity
In short, "the law" concerning congressional power to abrogate
states' immunity, as it stood after Parden, Government Employees,
Edelman, and Usery, is that Congress does have power to impose
suit upon the states, despite the eleventh amendment and other
sovereign immunity doctrines, in any area in which it has regulatory
power. (Its regulatory power, however,' is subject to some limits
when it regulates states as states, as found in Usery.) It appears that
whenever a valid congressional enactment imposes- suit, the Court
will infer the states' consent to suit. But since the Court's holding
has never actually rested upon congressional power to. impose suit
in a situation, like Government Employees, where it is particularly
difficult to find state consent, one cannot be certain that a fictional
consent to support congressional power will always be found.
It is also noteworthy that while the cases do not discuss the
issue as such, they set no apparent limit on the type of relief Congress can impose against the states. Edelman held that in the absence of congressional authorization the judiciary should not award
money judgments to be paid from state funds, even though injunctive relief may be proper."14 It did not, however, throw into question congressional power to authorize money judgments against
the states.
Prior opinions had made quite clear that Congress could impose this form of relief against the states. Indeed, the question of
congressional power to authorize private, federal suits against the
states has always been posed in the context of congressional imposition of damage remedies against states. Parden held that a statute
making railroads "liable in damages" to injured employees 115 applied to state-owned railroads along with others. The Government
Employees Court was "reluctant to believe" that Congress would
86
choose to grant individuals double recovery against the states," but
113 It is not clear from Mr. Justice Marshall's discussions which of these alternatives he would espouse, if indeed he would follow the governmental-proprietary
distinction at all.
114 This question of appropriate forms of relief is the subject of the final article
in this' series.
115 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
110 The double damages provision in the FLSA was not as great a problem as
the Court suggested. Under the statute, good faith on the part of the defendant
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it cast no doubt upon Congress' power to do so." 7 It implied that
it saw no problem arising from congressional authorization of a
damage remedy against states when it said that Congress could
"place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States" even in
connection with governmental activities.& 8 (Usery now undercuts
some applications of this principle to governmental activities.)
This is the law as it stood prior to Fitzpatrick. A substantial
issue concerning Fitzpatrick is whether it altered any of these
propositions.
F. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and the Special Problem of the
Civil War Amendments
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"9 the Tide VII case upholding a congressional authorization of private damage suits against the states,
the Supreme Court held that Congress' power under section five of
the fourteenth amendment is not subject to the eleventh amendment. It had long been argued that the fourteenth and the other
Civil War amendments 1 20 modify the eleventh amendment. As
early as Ex parte Young, the Court had noted the issue and avoided
resolving it.121 The issue had also arisen in Edelman v. Jordan,"2
where the NAACP Legal Defense Fund argued to the Supreme
Court, in its amicus curiae brief, that the eleventh amendment was
inapplicable to actions under the Civil War amendments,12 3 The
Court did not explicitly address this contention, and Justice Mar-t
shall, writing separately, claimed that it was left an open question.
The Court's reasoning in Edelman did suggest, however, that actions
based on the fourteenth amendment were not to be given special
obviated double recovery; and even if there were bad faith, double recovery was
discretionary with the judge. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. V 1975).
117 411 U.S. at 286.
118 Id. 284.
119427 U.S. 445 (1976).
120 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 454 & n.10, the Court discusses the
thirteenth amendment. Later in the opinion the Court speaks of "the Civil War
Amendments," saying that they allow "intrusions by Congress" into areas previously
reserved to the states. Id. 455. Reason would suggest that the same rule should
apply to the enforcement provisions of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments as
applies to section five of the fourteenth amendment. Other amendments with
similar enforcement provisions might be similarly treated. See US. Coqs=. amends.
XIX, para. 2 and XXIV, § 2.
121209 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1908).
122415

U.S. 651 (1974).

123 Brief Amicus Curia of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,

Inc., at 8-18 [hereinafter cited as Brief].
124415 U.S. at 694 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (speaking in terms of fourteenth amendment only).
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treatment. It overruled earlier cases allowing retroactive monetary
relief that were based on the fourteenth amendment, 125 and it discussed fourteenth amendment cases as though they were not distinguishable on that ground. 1 26 It should be noted that the issue
raised in Edelman was whether the fourteenth amendment generally
modifies the eleventh; the issue was not limited to section five of the
fourteenth amendment. The -Court in Fitzpatrick held only that
Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment is
27
not subject to the eleventh amendment.
In concluding that section five of the fourteenth amendment is
independent of any sovereign immunity restrictions, the Fitzpatrick
Court emphasized:
[The Fourteenth] Amendment quite clearly contemplates
limitations on [the states'] authority. In relevant part, it
provides:
"Section 1. ...
No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
"Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."
The substantive provisions are by express terms directed
at the States. Impressed upon them by those provisions
are duties with respect to their treatment of private individuals. Standing behind the imperatives is Congress'
power to "enforce" them "by appropriate legislation." 128
Furthermore, the Court quoted approvingly from Ex parte
Virginia 29 that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments "'were
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the
States and enlargements of the power of Congress' "; 130 and that
congressional enforcement of those limitations "'is no invasion of
1251Id.

670-71 & n.13.

The most important of these cases was Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

126 415 U.S. at 664, 666-67, 670-71, 677 n.13.
27
'
See note 139 infra & accompanying text.
128

427 U.S. at 453.

129 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
130 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
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State sovereignty,' "131 even when it touches areas like jury selection
and administration of state laws,132 "spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States." 133
In some ways the argument tells us little. As the Court recognized elsewhere in Ex parte Virginia, every constitutional grant of
power to Congress diminishes the powers of states.' 34 The Court
also recognizes elsewhere in Fitzpatrick that its argument does not
address the question why the eleventh amendment does not nonetheless protect the states from private federal suit,135 leaving Congress free to regulate the states through other means. The eleventh
and fourteenth amendments could then both be applicable in the
same area, instead of the fourteenth amendment modifying the
eleventh. In Government Employees the Court made the point that
Congress can effectively regulate states through means other than
private federal suit; the Court held such suits barred, yet claimed
nonetheless that Congress' regulation was applicable and enforce3
able.1 6
The Fitzpatrick Court's conclusion that the fourteenth amendment allowed Congress in Title VII to subject states to private
damage actions in federal court amounts, in the last analysis, to little
more than an ipse dixit:
It is true that none of [the] previous cases [sanctioning
congressional intrusions, under the Civil War amendments,
into areas previously reserved to the states] presented the
question of the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement power granted to Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we think
that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that
section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce
"by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody
427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
427 U.S. at 454.
133 Id. 455.
134 "Indeed every addition of power to the general government involves a
corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved
out of them." Id. 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879)).
'13

132

135 427 U.S. at 456 ("It is true that none of these previous cases presented the
question of the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement
power granted to Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
13 6 See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra and text accompanying notes
181-82, 190-92 infra.
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significant limitations on state authority. When Congress
acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.
We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. See Edelman v.
Jordan,7supra;Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
13
supra.
Nonetheless it does represent a clear holding that the eleventh
amendment does not constrain Congress when it acts "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the fourteenth amendment]." 188
Unquestionably the Fitzpatrick holding is limited to actions
authorized by Congress pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment. 39 While the Court does not separate the issues, there
are three different subholdings in the Fitzpatrick opinion: (1) Under
the fourteenth amendment, Congress can regulate, through the imposition of private suits, even activities most central to states' governmental processes; (2) Congress can impose suit without the necessity
of even a fictional consent by the states; and (3) Congress can impose
even suits for retroactive monetary relief upon the states. While
Fitzpatrick limits the first of these subholdings to fourteenth amendment cases, I believe that it does not so limit the last two.
137

427 U.S. at 456.

138 U.S. CoNsT.

amend. XIV, § 5.

1397he limitation is apparent in the first two sentences of the Fitzpatrick
opinion:
In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against
a state government found to have subjected that person to employment
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as
against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the
Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Congress
has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against
the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
427 U.S. at 447-48 (footnote omitted). See also language quoted in text accompanying note 137 supra and note 143 infra.
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1. Imposition of Suit upon States "In Their Capacities as
Sovereign Governments" 140
The Court's implication, in the statements quoted above,1 41
that the Civil War amendments show a cession of state power to
Congress in a special way makes more sense if one bears in mind
that the Court is discussing federal regulation of activities central to
the states' governmental function. It should be noted that the Court
avoided the terms "governmental" and "proprietary" in its opinion.
Indeed its references to this issue are sufficiently oblique that one
unfamiliar with the preceding case law could miss this thrust of the
Fitzpatrick opinion. 142 Instead of using the "governmental-proprietary" terminology, the Court said it was "aware of the factual differences between the type of state activity involved in Parden and
that involved in [Fitzpatrick]. . . ." It is concerning this distinction that the Fitzpatrick Court considered it significant that the
statutory provisions in question were enacted under Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement power. 143 Without being willing
to adopt the governmental-proprietary terminology, Fitzpatrick,
then, suggests an intention to limit this part of its holding-that
Congress can impose private suits on states even in connection with
state activities' most central to state sovereignty-to actions Congress
has authorized pursuant to the Civil War amendments.
Prior eleventh amendment case law had not suggested that such
a distinction, according to the type of state activity at stake, would
be significant to the scope of congressional power under either the
14ONational League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), uses this
formulation to describe what is more readily called the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction. I hesitate to rely exclusively upon the usual "governmental-proprietary"
terminology, because the Fitzpatrick Court went to such lengths to avoid using
those terms. See text accompanying notes 141-43 infra.
141 See text accompanying notes 128-33 & 137 supra.
42
L In contrast to the failure to adopt any descriptive formulation in Fitzpatrick,
the Court's opinion in Usery, also authored by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, uses many
different formulations to describe the area immune from congressional control. See
note 86 supra.

143 We are aware of the factual differences between the type of state
activity involved in Parden and that involved in the present case, but we
do not think that difference is material for our purposes. The congressional authorization involved in Parden was based on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause; here, however, the Eleventh Amendment
defense is asserted

in the

context of legislation passed pursuant to

Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
427 U.S. at 452 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the long discussion of Ex parte
Virginia which follows, id. 453-55, concerns congressional power to regulate state
activities central to states' governmental functions: jury selection for state courts
and administration of state laws.
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fourteenth amendment or any other grant of power to Congress. 144
But Usery, decided after Edelman and before Fitzpatrick, had told
us that at least some congressional regulations enacted under the
commerce power cannot "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." 145 It not only prevented subjecting states to suit; it
forbade the regulations altogether. Fitzpatrick complements Usery
when it implies that acting pursuant to most of its powers other than
the fourteenth amendment, Congress may not impose suit as a means
of regulating central governmental activities. Fitzpatrick thereby
gives an eleventh amendment basis as well for Usery's prohibition.
Usery also had indicated the possibility that fourteenth amendment
cases would receive different treatment-that under its fourteenth
amendment powers Congress could regulate even the activities at
issue there. 146 Thus, Fitzpatrick'sruling that Congress can do so by
imposing private federal damage actions fits in with the Usery
opinion.
If Usery had removed altogether congressional power to regulate "states as states," except under the fourteenth amendment or
the spending power, Fitzpatrick then would add little. Insofar as
Usery is applied more narrowly, 147 however, there is greater practical
importance to Fitzpatrick's implication that under powers other
than the fourteenth amendment, Congress cannot impose suit on
states for essential governmental activities. Insofar as that implication would apply to activities outside of Usery's exemption from
congressional regulation, there would be a category of cases in which
regulation is valid but imposition of suit is not. Fitzpatrick may
also thereby suggest, contrary to the suggestion of Government
Employees, that fictional consent to suit would not be imputed
144 See text accompanying note 77 supra. The distinction had, however, moved
the Court in Government Employees to impose a heavy presumption against con-

gressional intent to subject the states to suit. See note 74 supra.
145 426 U.S. at 852. For other formulations of the limits on Congress' power,
see note 86 supra.
14
6'We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.

147 See note 88 and text accompanying notes 87-90 supra. In Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977), appeal pending, No.
77-1846 (5th Cir., oral argument scheduled for June, 1978) the court held that
Usery had no application to congressional enactments pursuant to the war powers,
and it intimated that Usery was limited to congressional enactments pursuant to the
commerce power. Id. 458-59. Although the state has appealed the court's eleventh
amendment holdings in that ease, see notes 154, 169 & 287 infra, it has not appealed
this limitation on Usery.
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merely from states' operations in their essential governmental
capacities. 148
The Fitzpatrick holding that Congress may regulate essential
governmental functions of the states under the fourteenth amendment is sensible. The fourteenth amendment envisions federal
regulation of the substance of state action more clearly than other
grants of power to Congress do. If one compares it with the commerce clause, involved in Usery, for example, the difference is apparent. The grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce is
interpreted today to allow congressional regulation of states, at least
when they engage in proprietary activities in commerce. 149 Conceivably, however, the commerce power could have been interpreted
not to contemplate regulation of state activity at all. That grant of
power to Congress would still diminish state power by itself preempting, and allowing Congress further to preempt, matters that
the states could otherwise regulate. But since most commerce to be
regulated is not carried on by states, an interpretation that Congress
was not allowed to regulate states at all under that provision would
not displace the commerce power. A large area for regulation would
remain. The same is true of the position the Court has adoptedthat Congress cannot regulate states under the commerce power in
some of their governmental capacities. 150
The main thrust of the fourteenth amendment, by contrast, is
to allow federal supervision and regulation of state action and of
the state machinery as such. It is to regulate state action at the core
of states' governmental processes-e.g., to outlaw the enactment and
administration of discriminatory state laws-as well as in areas less
central to states' governmental functions. To accomplish this purpose, Congress must be able to regulate the states under the fourteenth amendment; furthermore, it would make no sense to hold
that under the fourteenth amendment it could not reach states acting in their governmental capacity.
This is not to suggest that the holding that the fourteenth
amendment permits Congress to authorize private federal suits
against states was absolutely compelled. The fourteenth amendment
could still have had some effect if Congress were limited to other
148 Thus the court of appeals held in Fitzpatrick that although Congress had
intended to create a cause of action against states, it had not effectively done so
because there had been no waiver; the state could not realistically abandon its
employee pension program. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See text accompanying notes 159 & 160 infra.
149 E.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor,
353 U.S. 553 (1957); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
150National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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means of enforcement, although the amendment's explicit creation
of rights in private individuals cuts against this interpretation. 151
But the rule that Usery created for the commerce clause simply
could not have been carried over to the fourteenth amendment;
state governmental processes could have been exempt from congressional regulation generally under the commerce clause, and not only
from imposition of suit, but they could not have been exempt from
congressional regulation generally under the fourteenth amend52
ment.1
In addition to its holding that under the fourteenth amendment
Congress may impose suit against states for actions done even in
performance of strictly governmental functions, there are two other
interesting implications of the Fitzpatrick opinion. One of these is
relevant to the issue of state consent; the other, to imposition of a
retroactive monetary remedy against the states.
2. Consent
Fitzpatrick appears to reflect a change in theory on the issue
whether a state must consent to suit in order for Congress to impose
suit. It suggests that not even a fictional consent by the states is
requisite to congressional imposition of suit. It suggests this by
distinguishing Fitzpatrick from Edelman and Government Employees on the ground that Congress had not authorized suit in those
15 3
cases, saying Fitzpatrick is like Pardenin this respect.

In so doing the Court makes no mention of any need for state
consent. It does not discuss consent at all, and it does not limit to
fourteenth amendment cases its implication that even a fictional
state consent is unnecessary as long as Congress has imposed suit
upon the states. 15 4 It is concerning the governmental-proprietary
15'The fifteenth amendment is similar to the fourteenth in this respect.
Thirteenth amendment rights, by contrast, are implicit.
152 Of course, we now know that individuals can obtain injunctive relief
against unconstitutional state action without encountering any eleventh amendment
problem; such suits are deemed to be suits against individual state officers and not
against the sovereign. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). While some cases
already foreshadowed this rule when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, it is
unlikely that the amendments framers had any firm sense that the states would be
subject to suits for injunctions even if no fourteenth amendment provisions modified
the eleventh amendment.
' 53 "Our analysis begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case the
'threshold fact of congressional authorization,' [415 U.S.] at 672, to sue the State as
employer is clearly present. This is, of course, the prerequisite found present in
Parden and wanting in Employees....
." 427 U.S. at 452.
1,4 A subsequent district court case seemingly follows, through with this implication that even constructive consent is no longer required. Peel v. Florida
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distinction that the Court found it significant that the legislation in
Fitzpatrick was based upon Congress' fourteenth amendment
powers, 155 not concerning state consent. 156 If sovereign immunity
is a constitutional requirement, however, it is difficult to justify the
abolition of a state consent requirement when Congress has acted
under a power (such as the commerce power involved in Parden)
that existed before the eleventh amendment. 157 That difficulty, together with the obliqueness of any discussion of the consent requirement in Fitzpatrick.,5 8 suggests that courts may continue to require
at least a fictional consent in actions Congress has imposed in the
exercise of powers other than those granted by the fourteenth
amendment.
If the Court in Fitzpatrick would in any event have inferred a
fictional state consent to suit, the Court's abandonment of the consent requirement does not affect the result. In Fitzpatrick the Court
does not confirm whether it would follow through with the willingness it had shown in Government Employees to infer consent even
from states engaging in essential sovereign functions. Instead its
holding that no consent was necessary to uphold congressional imposition of suit avoided once again a definitive pronouncement on
whether state consent could be inferred from the state engaging in
an activity central to its functioning as a state. 59 Just as it was
difficult to infer consent in Government Employees, it would have
been difficult to do so in Fitzpatrick; one cannot say that a state has
consented to federal court suit by passing a law, which is alleged to
be discriminatory, as easily as one might if the state operated an
allegedly discriminatory railroad system. A fictional consent might
be implied from the states' ratification of the Civil War amendDep't of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977), appeal pending, No.
77-1846 (5th Cir., oral argument scheduled for June, 1978), involved a congressional enactment pursuant to the article I war powers, not the fourteenth amendment, and the court, upholding the enactment, discussed only congressional power;
it did not mention any need for state consent.
155 See text accompanying notes 143-46 supra.
156 Of course, there is an interrelationship between governmental-proprietary
distinctions in this area and difficulties of imputing consent to states. See text
accompanying notes 71-76, 100-04 supra.
157 BUt see text accompanying notes 233-63 infra.
15 8 The full discussion of consent is the language quoted in note 153 supra.

That language is followed immediately by the language quoted in note 143 supra,
discussing the governmental-proprietary distinction and how it is irrelevant to cases
based on section five of the fourteenth amendment.
159 The Government Employees Court had, however, indicated a willingness to
make the inference. See note 58 and text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
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ments, 1 0 but that position is equivalent to saying that the fourteenth amendment modifies the eleventh. The question whether
state consent will be implied from states' engaging in essential sovereign functions may still arise when Congress has acted under
powers other than those granted by the Civil War amendments, but
only if the particular regulation of essential state functions is
deemed not to transgress Usery's protection of state sovereignty." 1
3. Retroactive Monetary Relief
The most significant issue that Fitzpatrick touches is the propriety of actions for retroactive monetary relief. Fitzpatrick's holding is consistent with prior case law on this subject: 102 It upholds
Congress' authorization, in Title VII, of private damage actions
against the states. But Fitzpatrick breeds confusion because its
language carries a possible implication that damage awards may be
authorized only under Congress' fourteenth amendment powers. If
this were true, it would upset prior case law upholding damage
awards against states in actions authorized under Congress' article
16 3
I powers.
A single sentence in the Fitzpatrick opinion causes the confusion. At the conclusion of its fourteenth amendment discussion,'"
the Court says:
We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or State officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. See Edelman v.
Jordan,supra; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
supra.165
16
OThe NAACP made this argument in its Edelman amicus curiae brief.
Brief, supra note 123, at 34-39.
161 For example, if Congress enacts a health regulation to apply in both public
and private places of employment, and allows private individuals to bring federal
damage suits against state employers along with others, will that provision for
private damage actions be respected (with state consent to suit either imputed or
deemed unnecessary), or will the federal government be limited to authorizing other
kinds of actions against state officials?
162 See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
163 Parden is the only holding that damage awards are authorized, but language
in both Government Employees and Edelman upholds the rule. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
-164 The full passage is quoted in text accompanying note 137 supra.
165 427 U.S. at 456.
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It is the citation to Edelman, noted for its holding that retroactive
monetary relief is impermissible in the absence of congressional authorization, 166 that imparts the suggestion that retroactive monetary
awards are "constitutionally impermissible" in contexts other than
67
fourteenth amendment actions.1

This Fitzpatrick sentence alone should not be taken to establish
that Congress cannot authorize retroactive monetary relief against
the states pursuant to its powers under provisions other than the
Civil War amendments. 168 While the implication is there, it is extremely unlikely that such a significant change in doctrine would be
announced so lightly, or so obliquely. As noted above, Parden had
sustained damage awards against states. The case law generally had
suggested that damages could be awarded against states when Congress authorized them, although a federal court could not order that
remedy under a jurisdictional statute that did not expressly authorize suit against the state. Moreover Fitzpatrick itself, in its earlier
discussion, recognized that Edelman's striking down of retroactive
monetary awards against states is limited to situations in which there
was no "congressional intent to abrogate the immunity conferred by
the Eleventh Amendment." 169
Another reason for concluding that Congress can authorize
awards of damages, when it has power to impose suits on states at
all, is that congressional authorizations of suit are meaningful only
166 See text accompanying note 114 supra and text accompanying notes 290-97
infra. Of course, any remedy is impermissible in the absence of congressional (or

constitutional) authorization. The Edelman holding in effect is that the judiciary
is not free to find an implied cause of action for damages in these circumstances,
unless Congress (or the Constitution) allows it more clearly than here. See text
accompanying notes 290-97 infra. Another significant aspect of Edelman's holding
is that the suit will be deemed one against the state if the state will pay the award
sought.

167 Similarly, the citation to Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323
U.S. 459 (1945), a case noted for its strict view of state consent to suit, might be
taken to imply that genuine state consent is required in all but fourteenth amendment cases.
168 Professor Nowak also takes the position that Congress may authorize damage

actions against the states, either under its fourteenth amendment powers or under any
of its other powers. He comes to the same conclusion concerning congressional
power under the Civil War amendments and other congressional powers, although
he puts forth independent historical arguments for these interpretations of the
fourteenth and eleventh amendments. See Nowak, supra note 96, at 1453-55.
169 427 U.S. at 451-52. See id. 452 ("Our analysis begins where Edelman
ended, for in this Title VII case the 'threshold fact of congressional authorization'
. . . to sue the State as employer is clearly present"); Peel v. Florida Dep't
of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451, 461-62 (N.D. Fla. 1977), appeal pending, No.

77-1846 (5th Cir., oral argument scheduled for June, 1978) (interpreting Edelman
to hold simply that without congressional authorization it is improper to award
retroactive monetary relief against states).
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if they make available some such remedy. Suits for injunctions
against unconstitutional conduct are available even without specific
authorization, because the Court has found implied rights of action
in the Constitution and has avoided any sovereign immunity bar
by conceiving of the suits as actions against individual officers, not
against the state. 170 The reason the congressional authorization
issue has generated substantial Supreme Court interest is that it has
had the effect of providing a damage remedy, an additional remedy
which otherwise would be unavailable.
G. Summary
Fitzpatrick has seemed significant only because phraseology that
it occasionally employs throws into question some propositions that
were established before Fitzpatrick. In the last analysis, the case
tells us little that we did not know before.17 '
In Fitzpatrick congressional regulation covered state employees
in strictly governmental capacities. Imposition of the damage
remedy may therefore have been justifiable only because Congress
acted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. 172 In proprietary
areas, however, Congress, acting under any of its powers, may impose damage suits upon the states. If Congress has imposed suit in
connection with proprietary activities, consent by the state is either
unnecessary or will automatically be imputed to the states.
Although Congress may impose damage actions, courts may not
find damages an implied remedy in the absence of congressional
authorization. It is this last point that reconciles Fitzpatrick with
Edelman; the self-executing provisions of section one of the fourteenth amendment do not modify the eleventh amendment, although
170 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
171 After Fitzpatrick, we know that Congress can regulate states, even in their
governmental activities, when it acts under the fourteenth amendment; we know
that when Congress exercises its powers to regulate states by abrogating their immunity, state consent is not required (at least when Congress acts under the fourteenth amendment); and we know that Congress may impose suits for retroactive
monetary relief (at least when Congress acts under the fourteenth amendment).
The items in parentheses are possibilities but are not clearly parts of the holding.
The only significant change in law the above statements would represent is the
possible limitation, to the fourteenth amendment, of the last proposition. The
second proposition reflects some change in theory, substituting a pure congressional
power rationale for a constructive consent one. (It is less significant if it is indeed
limited to the fourteenth amendment than if it is not.)
172For a different view, see the position of Mr. Justice Stevens, writing separately, set out in note 32 supra. And even under the Court's approach, such
imposition would be impermissible only if the activity were deemed to fall within
the Usery ban. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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section five gives Congress power to modify it.-'7 Both section one
and section five, however, apply even to those state activities at the
core of states' governmental function.
In other words, the following proposition accurately summarizes
"the law" concerning congressional power: In the exercise of its
regulatory powers, Congress may impose even damage suits on states
acting in their more "proprietary" capacities, and under the Civil
War amendments it can impose such suits on states acting even in
strictly governmental capacities. 1'7 4
It should be noted that one situation is not covered by the above
statement: congressional regulation of states' governmental functions
on the basis of provisions other than the Civil War amendments (or
the spending power). The question of congressional power remains
open in this limited area, with Government Employees and Fitzpatrick perhaps implying different answers. The scope of the area
in which this uncertainty persists will depend upon whether Usery
is broadly or narrowly applied. Insofar as regulations of governmental activity are permissible after Usery, will state consent to suit
be prerequisite to suit? If so, will it be fictionally imputed, or will
the absence of consent sometimes prevent congressional imposition
of suit?
III.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The Court which has taken such a broad view of congressional
power has shown some disposition to create restrictive rules for
interpreting whether Congress has intended to exercise its power.
In every case it has heard, the Supreme Court has upheld congressional power to impose suit upon the states; yet some of the cases
have allowed suit against states and some have not. The results
have turned, not on the Court's power holdings, but on its view of
congressional intent' 7 5
73
1 For a discussion of the difficulties in maintaining this distinction, see text
accompanying notes 290-302 infra. Professor Nowak, however, agrees with the
distinction and supports it with an historical argument. See Nowak, supra note 96,

at 1455, 1460-64.

I do not find the historical argument compelling, but it does

show that, even if history does not mandate the result, it is consistent with it
174Besides the Civil War amendments, another likely exception, noted in
Usery, is the spending power. See 426 U.S. at 852 n.17 (quoted in note 146
supra). See also note 154 supra (war powers).
17GAll the congressional enactment cases contain both a congressional power
and a congressional intent issue. Government Employees is the only one of the

series in which the Court discusses congressional intent as the principal issue.
Edelman, the other case denying congressional intent, focuses chiefly on judicial
power to impose a damage remedy against states. See text accompanying notes
290-97 infra.
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It is likely that there is an interrelationship between the broad
view the Court has taken of congressional power and the narrow
view it has sometimes taken of congressional intent. The Court's
holdings that Congress did not intend to allow individuals to sue
states in federal court 176 may have been a bit disingenuous, and a
reluctance to confront the power issue may have contributed to the
intent findings. As we shall see, the later history of the legislation
involved in Government Employees provides support for the suggestion that unarticulated doubts concerning congressional power
contribute to holdings grounded upon an absence of congressional
intent; for when Congress later unambiguously expressed its intent
to impose suit in the legislation in question, 77 the Court held that
Congress lacked power to impose the legislation at all.
The case law concerning the rules for interpreting congressional
intent is as complex as it is concerning congressional power.
A. Two Approaches To DeterminingIntent: Parden and
Government Employees
Both Pardenand Government Employees involved the question
of congressional intent. They took different approaches to the question and reached different results. In Parden the Court held that
Congress had intended the Federal Employers Liability Act to apply
to state-owned railroads, as well as to others, and that states thus
were subject to enforcement and damage actions. The Court relied
principally upon the language of the FELA-making it applicable
to "every" interstate railroad 178-and the Act's general grant of
jurisdiction to federal district courts. 1 79

It held these provisions

sufficient to show congressional intent to impose suit upon states,
despite the dissenters' argument that "[o]nly when Congress has
clearly considered the problem and expressly declared that any State
which undertakes given regulable conduct will be deemed thereby
176 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
177 See note 79 supra.
17845 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).

It added, in a footnote:
Although the language of the Act itself is clear enough, further indication
of the congressional desire to cover all rail carriers that constitutionally

could be covered is found in the legislative history, where the House
Report states that "This bill relates to common carriers by railroad engaged
in interstate . . . commerce. . . . It is intended in its scope to cover
all commerce to which the regulative power of Congress extends." H.R.
Rep. No. 1386, To Accompany H.R. 20310, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908),
377 U.S. at 187 n.5.
179 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
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to have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation
of [a sovereign immunity] defense." 1s0
Nine years later, in Government Employees, the Court adopted
an approach similar to that of the dissenters in Parden. Conceding
congressional power,' 8 ' the Government Employees Court focused
its inquiry on congressional intent to subject states to suit; it found
that intent lacking. In so holding, it drew a dichotomy between
Congress regulating states and Congress taking from states their immunity from private suits in federal court: even when it was clear
that Congress had regulated states, their sovereign immunity from
suit would be deemed to survive in the absence of "clear language"
removing the immunity. 8 2
The evidence that Congress "intended" to impose liability on
the state as employer was as strong in Government Employees as it
was in Parden. The Fair Labor Standards Act, involved in Government Employees, regulates work conditions of "employers." The
definition of "employer," contained in section 3(d) of the Act, originally had excluded federal, state, and local governments; but that
definition was amended in 1966 to make states (and local governments) subject to the Act with respect to state (and local) hospital
The Supreme Court conceded in Governand school employees.' 3
ment Employees that the congressional amendments were intended
to regulate working conditions of state hospital and school employees, and that they had effectively done so.' 8 4 On this point, the
Court followed its holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, which had also
upheld the constitutionality of the Act so regulating the states.les
But in Government Employees the Court said that Wirtz was not
dispositive of whether Congress had thereby intended to subject
states to federal suits brought by aggrieved individuals.'5 6
The Act seemingly subjected states to suit along with other
employers, for section 16(b) provided:
180 377 U.S. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting).
181 See note 58 supra & accompanying text.
182 411 U.S. at 285.

18329 U.S.C. §203(d) (1964) (amended by Pub. L. No. 89-601 §102(b),
80 Stat. 831 (1966)).

The Act's definitions of "enterprise," 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)

(amended by Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 102(a), 80 Stat 831 (1966)); and of "enterprise engaged in commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (amended by Pub. L. No. 89-601
§ 102(c), 80 Stat. 831 (1966)) were also amended to cover employees of hospitals
and schools. See 411 U.S. at 282-83.
184 411 U.S. at 282-83.
1'5392 U.S. 183 (1968).
186 411 U.S. at 283. Similarly, in Wirtz, the Court reserved the question

whether the Act violated the eleventh amendment in providing a private damage
remedy against states.

392 U.S. at 200.
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Any employer who violates the provisions of [section 6 or
section 7 of this Act] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages. Action to recover such liability may be main187
tained in any court of competent jurisdiction ...
But the Court pointed out that the language in this section had not
been changed in 1966; and that before that date, because of the
definition of employer then prevalent, the language had not removed
states' immunity. It concluded that it should not infer that Congress had removed states' immunity from suit without amending
that section "or indicating in some way by clear language that the
constitutional immunity was swept away." l8 (The argument contra,
of course, is that since the amended FLSA clearly and in terms does
regulate the state as employer in its schools and hospitals, section
16(b) clearly and literally does make the state, with other employers,
liable in individuals' federal suits. Section 16(b) was not amended
in 1966 because no amendment of it was necessary to impose liability
on the states; with the amendments of sections 3(d), (r), and (s),189
the Act already clearly imposed that liability.)
The Court went on to say that its holding that Congress did
not intend to lift states' immunity did not render meaningless Congress' undoubted attempt to regulate state hospitals and schools in
its 1966 FLSA amendments, because the Act gave the Secretary of
Labor power to sue for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation. 190 The Court reached this conclusion even though it
noted that the Solicitor General had reported that the remedy was
ineffective, because the Secretary, with his limited resources, could
investigate less than four percent of the establishments subject to
the FLSA. 191 The Court also noted the possibility that suits against
state employers for damages for FLSA violations could be heard in
18729 U.S.C. §216(b)
188 411 U.S. at 285.

(1970) (emphasis added).

See note 183 supra.
190 411 U.S. at 285-86. The Act also gives the district courts power to grant
injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
The Court did not explain why it deemed the statutory language clear enough
to support actions by the Secretary against even state employers, but not a private
damage remedy. Probably the explanation is that no clear language was necessary
because the eleventh amendment does not apply to suits by the Secretary against
the state. Cf. text accompanying notes 229-32 infra (clear language rule limited
to enactments of doubtful constitutionality).
191411 U.S. at 287. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23.
189
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state court, and that the FLSA precluded states from claiming immunity there. 192
Government Employees and Parden appear to conflict in their
approaches to divining congressional intent. Both the FELA and
the FLSA literally imposed liability upon states as employers: the
former applied to "every" railroad; the latter, to "any" employer.
Moreover, in Government Employees the state as employer was
clearly-and expressly-within the regulatory reach of the statute
after its 1966 amendments, while the statutory scheme in Parden
made no explicit mention of state-owned railroads. Parden held,
however, that explicit mention was not required. In deciding that
state immunity had been lifted, the Parden Court reasoned that
federal statutes had been held to regulate state-owned railroads
along with other ones. 193 But in Government Employees, where
congressional regulation was explicit, the Court held that states'
sovereign immunity may remain even after their facilities have been
subjected to congressional regulation. The Parden Court had rejected this possibility partly because "[t]o read a 'sovereign immunity
exception' into the Act would result .

.

. in a right without a

remedy; it would mean that Congress made 'every' interstate railroad liable in damages to injured employees but left one class of
such employees-those whose employers happen to be state ownedwithout any effective means of enforcing that liability." 194 But the
relief remaining for state employees after the Government Employees decision was equally ineffective. 95 Furthermore, in Parden
411 U.S. at 287. See Part One, supra note 1, at 546-49.
While the Government Employees Court stressed the existence of alternative
remedies as a fact supporting the absence of congressional intent to allow private
suits, the Court in Edelman supported its conclusion there that no implicit private
right of action existed by stressing that the Social Security Act expressly provided
few remedies. 415 U.S. at 674.
193 377 U.S. at 188-89. What the Parden Court failed to mention was that
none of the cases so holding was an eleventh amendment case. The cases the
Court discussed were United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), (construing the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§2, 6 (1970)); California v.
Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (construing the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1970)), and three state court cases construing the FELA. (United
States v. California was not an eleventh amendment case because the United States
was the plaintiff; California v. Taylor was not a suit against the state, 353 U.S. at
555-56; the other cases were not eleventh amendment cases because they were
state court decisions.)
'94 377 U.S. at 190.
195 One of the judges who heard the case in the court of appeals had pointed
out that since the Secretary's enforcement powers are discretionary, "[a] suit by a
state employee under § 216(b) represents the only remedial provisions of the Act
which assures [a state employee] the opportunity of hearing his claim presented to
a court." 452 F.2d at 833 (Bright, J., dissenting). But cf. Part One, supra
note 1, at 546-49 (possibility of suit in state court).
192
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there were some means other than employees' damage actions by
which the duties imposed upon railroads in general might be enforced against state-owned railroads.19 6 Moreover, it apparently did
not occur to the Court in Parden that the suits might be heard only
197
in state court.
Finally, instead of requiring that Congress clearly express its
intention to deprive states of their immunity, the Parden Court used
language suggesting the opposite presumption:
If Congress made the judgment that . . .railroad workers

in interstate commerce should be provided with the right
of action created by the FELA, we should not presume to
say, in the absence of express provision to the contrary,
that it intended to exclude a particular group of such
workers [those whose employers are state-owned] from the
19 8
benefits conferred by the Act.
It is the Parden dissenters who argued "that if Congress decides to
exercise its power to condition privileges within its control on the
forfeiture of constitutional rights [specifically the states' constitutional immunity] its intention to do so should appear with unmistakable clarity." 199
Despite the apparent conflict, the Government Employees Court
purported not to disturb the Parden holding.20 0 It limited its clear
language requirement to regulations of state activities that are "not
proprietary," 2 01 or possibly to nonprofit state activities. 20 2 Presumably when proprietary or profit-making activities are at issue the
196 For example, monetary penalties were provided for violation of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act, see 45 U.S.C. § 34 (1970), which the individual damage
actions permitted in the FELA also enforce.
10 7 See 377 U.S. at 190 n.8; Part One, supra note 1, at 547.
198 377 U.S. at 189-90 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court had previously
said, in a non-eleventh amendment case, that "[wihen Congress wished to exclude
state employees, it expressly so provided." California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553,
564-65 (1957).
199 377 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying note
180 supra.
200 At the end of its Government Employees opinion the Court says, "Ne dedine to extend Pardere'to cover Government Employees. 411 U.S. at 286-87. At
the outset it says "the central issue" is whether Parden is distinguishable. Id. 281.
201 411 U.S. at 284-85.
202 Id. 285. Some opinions exhibit a tendency to regard the terms "governmental" and "proprietary" as equivalents of "profit-maling" and "not-for-profit."
See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Court); id. 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also language
quoted in text at note 220 infra. For other formulations of a government-proprietary
distinction, see note 86 supra.
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"normal" rules of ascertaining intent still obtain: Intent is judged
from all the circumstances concerning an enactment, without a requirement that the evidence of legislative purpose be in any particular form. The Court's limitation of its clear language rule to
nonproprietary state activities is sufficiently oblique, however, that
it is possible the clear language test could be carried over to proprietary activities. It may have been only a reluctance directly to
overturn the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the
subject when it was not absolutely necessary that led the Government Employees Court to devise this distinction between Govern203
ment Employees and Parden.
Another uncertainty after Government Employees is how
strictly the "clear language" requirement is to be defined and applied. Is an explicit statement lifting immunity necessary, as the
Government Employees holding might suggest, or will other clear
indications of intent suffice? If an explicit statement is necessary,
must it be in the enactment itself, as distinct from the legislative
history, for example? Government Employees itself does not answer
these questions; indeed, it leaves considerable ambiguity. One of
the Court's statements might be read to imply that express language
in the enactment itself is necessary: "It would also be surprising
. . . to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional
immunity without changing the old § 16(b) under which she could
not be sued or indicating in some way by clear language that the
constitutional immunity was swept away." 204 Yet the Court also
emphasized that "not a word in the history of the 1966 amend203 Prior to Governent Employees the Court did not follow any governmentalproprietary distinction in determining federal sovereign immunity issues, see, e.g.,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704-05 (1949),
although the distinction has traditionally been employed in determining municipal
459-66 (1958). There is
liability, see 3 K. DAvIs, ADMrsITRA T E L&w TnpxA
some language in Parden that might suggest a governmental-proprietary test, but in
context it is clear that when the Parden Court speaks of "a State leav[ing] the
sphere that is exclusively its own," 377 U.S. at 196, it does not refer to a state
engaging in an enterprise operated for profit, or a proprietary enterprise otherwise
defined; it is speaking of a state operating in an area to which congressional
regulatory power extends. See language quoted in text accompanying note 61 supra.
In those contexts in which it has been used, a governmental-proprietary distinction has proved difficult. See, e.g., 3 K. DAvis, ADMInIsTRATIVE LAW TnETTSE
459-66 (1958). It was long an issue whether such a distinction should be read into
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970), but in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), the Court rejected the "'non-governmental'"governmental"' distinction as "inherently unsound." Id. 66. See Rayonier Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). See also Graves v. New York ex -rel.O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (state immunity from federal taxation).
204 411 U.S. at 285.
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ments" 205 showed a congressional purpose to impose suit upon
states, and more generally that "the purpose of Congress" to lift
states' immunity was "not clear." 2106Another formulation the Court
uses is to say that in the face of congressional silence, a court should
not presume that suit is imposed.207 An important question left
open in Government Employees is therefore how rigidly the "clear
language" test is to be applied.
B. Edelman and Fitzpatrick
The cases since Government Employees are inconclusive concerning the future vitality of a "clear language" requirement. Edelman v. Jordan is consistent with a clear language rule but does not
enhance it. Nor does Edelman show whether a clear language rule
will be applied in its stricter implications. The court of appeals in
Edelman had held that the state had waived any objection to suit
when it participated in the AABD program-the equivalent of a
holding that Congress required a waiver as a condition of participating and receiving federal funds. 208 The Supreme Court overturned
that ruling because no language in the Social Security Act purports
to allow suit against the states.
As in Government Employees, what was missing in Edelman
was congressional authorization to maintain the suit. As the Court
recognized, however, the issue was unlike the Government Employees and Parden authorization issues. In both of those cases
there was a congressional authorization literally allowing suit against
states as such. In Edelman, however, all agreed that the only arguably relevant congressional authorization was section 1983, allowing
suit against state officers acting under color of state law, 209 not against
the state as such. The dispositive issue, therefore, was whether a
suit maintained in that form may reach state funds. When the
Supreme Court held that it could not, without becoming a suit
against the state as such, which no congressional enactment purported to allow,210 it effectively decided the case; the suit could not
205 Id.

206 Id. 287.
207 Id. 284-85.
20sJordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-95 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
20942 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
210 Unlike the statutes involved in Parden and Government Employees, the
provisions of the Social Security Act involved in Edelman contained no language
even arguably allowing individual suit against states. The only remedy that the Act
expressly provided for a state's failure to comply with federal requirements was a
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stand although section 1983 allows relief against the state officer
211
which in form is what the Edelman suit requested.
Edelman thus requires some language-some enactment imposing suit upon the states as such-before monetary relief can be obtained from the state treasury. It does not tell us whether or not a
clear language rule would have been used to construe such an en212
actment had there been one.
A simple reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer gives the impression that the clear language requirement
has been abandoned. The Court's full discussion of the intent issue
is contained in the first sentence of its opinion:
In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award
money damages in favor of a private individual against a
state government found to have subjected that person to
employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 213
The Court subscribed unanimously to this effortless discovery of
congressional intent to subject states to private suit.2 14 Yet the data
the Court cites in support of its finding does not serve to distinguish
cut-off of federal funds by the Secretary of HEW. 42 U.S.C. § 804 (1964). Prior
to Edelman, in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the Court had held that
Congress had not intended the cut-off of federal funds as the exclusive sanction but
had intended § 1983 remedies to supplement it. The Court in Edelman did not
overturn Rosado but simply held the § 1983 route unavailable when the suit is one
against the state. 415 U.S. at 675-77.
211 The court of appeals, Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d at 985, and Justices
Douglas, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and
Marshall, id. 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.), thought that
Congress had intended individual recipients to have a cause of action under § 1983
for wrongfully withheld benefits, even though the benefits would be paid from the
state treasury. That position was supported by HEW regulations requiring states to
make corrective payments retroactively when a recipient challenges denial of
assistance in a statutorily required "fair hearing." 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (18).
See also 45 C.F.R. §§205.10(b)(2), (b)(3). The Court, however, was unwilling
to find congressional intent to impose these suits upon the states in the absence of
statutory language to that effect. See text accompanying notes 295-97 infra.
Justice Brennan also dissented, but on his view of the case he had no occasion
to reach this issue.
The complex of distinctions between suits against officers and suits against the
state will be explored in the final article in this series.
2 2
1 This last question was the issue in both Parden and Government Employees.
For further discussion of the relationship between the Edelman rule requiring literal
congressional authorization and the clear language rule, see text accompanying notes
290-98 infra.
213 427 U.S. at 447-48.
214 justice Brennan and Justice Stevens concurred separately, but neither questioned the Court's finding of congressional intent to impose suit.
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the case from Government Employees. Title VII, like the Fair
Labor Standards Act involved in Government Employees, had originally excluded states from its reach by not including them among
the affected employers.215 Like the FLSA, Title VII had since been
amended-by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972-to
include state governments in its definition of employer, 216 and to
include government employees among the covered employees. 217
While this might reasonably be deemed to show a congressional
intent to extend to state employees the benefits of the Act, precisely
the same argument was available as proved dispositive in Government Employees: Congress could have regulated states as employers
without requiring them to give up their immunity from individuals'
suits. Moreover, no language specifically stated that states' immunity
was abrogated.21 8
Fitzpatrick is, however, consistent with Government Employees
because of another section of Title VII. Section 2000e-5(f)(l),
setting forth the procedure for civil actions,2 19 makes explicit mention of the procedure to be followed when the respondent is a
government, government agency, or political subdivision. While it
does not expressly refer to federal suits, that section of the Act contains references to ongoing state proceedings that certainly suggest
that a federal forum for these individual suits against states was
contemplated.
Although section 2000e-5(f)(l) does make Fitzpatrick consistent
with Government Employees, the Fitzpatrick Court did not feature
that section as the distinguishing factor; nor did its opinion disclose
enough about the section to show why Fitzpatrick and Government
Employees are consistent. This failure to focus upon the distinguishing variable may show a disposition not to take seriously
Government Employees' requirements for a clear language test.
In any event, Fitzpatrick shows that the Court will not read a
clear language test as strictly as might have been possible. Although
the statutory language involved in Fitzpatrick did clearly indicate
21542 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), (b) (1970) (as amended by Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 §§ 2(l), (2), 86 Stat. 103).
21642 U.S.C. §§2000e(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975) (as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 §§ 2(1), (2), 86 Stat. 103).
21742 U.S.C. §§2000e(a), (b), (f) (Supp. V 1975) (as amended by Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 §§2(1), (2), (5), 86
Stat. 103).
218 As in Government Employees, the section giving a cause of action to aggrieved employees was retained unamended. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)-5(j) (Supp.
V 1975).
21942 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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that Congress contemplated state liability in individuals' federal
suits, neither the statute nor the legislative history contained a
statement in terms removing the states' immunity, and no such
statement was deemed necessary. Fitzpatrick may, therefore, show
that any "clear language" requirement can be fulfilled by statutory
language that in any way provides clear evidence of congressional
intent; no clear statement specifically addressing states' amenability
to suit is necessary.
C. The Clear Language Rule Today
The importance of correctly applying the clear language requirement diminishes if one accepts at face value the Government
Employees Court's distinction of Pardenas involving a state activity
"in the area where private persons and corporations normally ran
the enterprise." 220 For with this restriction, the clear language requirement operates in a limited area today. Like other rules,

221

the

clear language requirement may have been largely displaced by
National League of Cities v. Usery, depending upon how broadly
that case is applied. If Usery were read so broadly that the only
activities remaining within Congress' reach under the commerce
clause were "nongovernmental" activities (where Parden and
Government Employees together suggest that the usual rules concerning implication of congressional intent apply), Usery would displace the clear language test by removing altogether from congressional regulatory power the area in which the test was to apply.
But to the extent that Usery is read narrowly, permitting Congress
still to regulate areas central to states' governmental functions under
the commerce clause, 222 the clear language requirement could remain relevant. Moreover, the rule might apply to those congressional regulations of states' governmental functions that are still
permissible after Usery under powers other than the commerce
power.223 (The fact that "the Commerce Clause . . .has grown to

vast proportions in its applications" 224 was part of the impetus for
creation of a clear language test, but the test could have application
to other exercises of congressional power as well.) One area where
we know (from Fitzpatrick) that regulation of governmental activi220 411

221 See
2 22
See
223 See
224 411
cover every

U.S. at 284.
text accompanying notes 89-90, 144-48 supra.
notes 86-88 supra & accompanying text.
notes 146-47 and text accompanying note 89 supra.
U.S. at 285. See also id. 286-87 ("[W]e decline to extend Parden to
exercise by Congress of its commerce power. ... ").
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ties is still contemplated is in Congress' exercise of power under section five of the fourteenth amendment. Another possibility suggested
in Usery is the spending power, which was involved in Edelman.
As we have seen, it is not clear whether Edelman and Fitzpatrick
followed Government Employees' approach in determining congressional intent. Neither case spoke in terms of a clear language rule,
though neither is flatly inconsistent with it. Possibly, however,
exercises of congressional power under these provisions would be
deemed exempt from a clear language requirement for the same
reasons that they are exempt from Usery's ban on regulation of state
governmental activities.
In areas in which Congress does retain power to regulate states
in their governmental capacities, no clear language rule should
apply. The merits of a clear language rule will be addressed later
in this Article,225 but from what we have seen already, it is apparent
that Government Employees' clear language rule was the product of
a situation peculiar to that case. The Court was faced with congressional regulations of state employees' hours and wages-regulations whose constitutionality the Court had upheld eight years before 20 over the dissent of Justice Douglas, the author of the Court's
Government Employees opinion. In Wirtz Justice Douglas had
expressed his discomfort with allowing Congress to extend to state
hospitals and schools its maximum hour and minimum wage legislation, and thereby to "overwhelm state fiscal policy" 22 and "devour
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested
by the Tenth Amendment." 228
It seems reasonable to conclude that Government Employees'
clear language rule was the product of uneasiness concerning the
constitutionality of those regulations of state employees' wages and
225 See text accompanying notes 290-309 infra.
22

6 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Without overturning Wirtz, the
Court could have resolved Government Employees by making a decision respecting
congressional power. In Wirtz, the appellant states had argued that the Act's
remedial provisions would violate the eleventh amendment, in addition to their
contention that Congress could not impose upon them these regulations. Upholding
regulation, the Court reserved the remedial issue "for appropriate future cases." 392
U.S. at 200. In Government Employees the Court could have held that Congress
lacked power to impose private suit against states in this governmental area, even
though it had power otherwise to regulate them. Instead it drew the same
dichotomy in interpreting congressional intent to impose suit.
227

392 U.S. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

228 Id. 205. He also said that sustaining the legislation was "such a serious
invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my
view not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Id. 201.
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hours.2 ; 9 It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to impose a

requirement that congressional intent be clearly stated if that intent
is found to support a statutory construction that is constitutionally
doubtful. 2 0 The Court's later holding, that the regulations were
indeed unconstitutional, reinforces the impression that uneasiness
with Wirtz was responsible for Government Employees' strong presumption of state immunity. But when there are not constitutional
doubts concerning a regulation, the need to construe it very narrowly disappears. 281 Therefore the special rule that Government
Employees adopts for determining congressional intent should not
carry over to congressional regulations that do not transgress constitutional limitations.

2 2
3

IV. DOES SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY RETAIN ANY

CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE?-THE

FORCE AS A

POSSIBILITY OF A DICHOTOMY

BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL POWER

Because the Court has left Congress free to impose suit upon
states whenever it acts within its regulatory powers, the Court's position seems to produce the same results as would obtain if the sovereign immunity doctrine had no constitutional status. There is,
however, a fundamental ambiguity in the Court's position in this
229 Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Government Employees, 411 U.S. at 304,
306, suggested that the Court's opinion there resulted from its unhappiness with
the result in Wirtz.
2 0
3 See generally Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-36
(1974). Cf. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 264 (1973) (advocating "a clear
statement rule: to depart from an established principle, the legislature must speak
plainly") (emphasis in original).
See also H. HAnT & A. SAcKs, ThE LEGAL PRocEss 1411-13 (tent. ed. 1958):
In discussing the clear statement rule (which the authors conceive as a rule against
attributing to words an unusual though linguistically possible meaning, id. 1411)
the authors say the rule "forbids a court to understand a legislature as directing a
departure from a generally prevailing principle or policy of the law unless it does
so clearly. This policy has special force when the departure is so great as to raise
a serious question of constitutional power....." Id. 1413.
231 See, e.g., Algonquin SNG Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 518 F.2d
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 548 (1976), wherein the court of appeals
construed very narrowly a seemingly broad congressional authorization to the
President to adjust imports because of apparent doubts concerning the constitutionality of such a broad delegation of trade policy to the executive. The
Supreme Court had no such doubts concerning the constitutionality of the delegation,
and as a result did not require clear and specific congressional authorization.
Instead it approached the statutory construction issues in a more ordinary fashion.
Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (without ruling on its
constitutionality, Court applies strict construction to find real purpose behind
federal legislation, applicable to aliens, which creates a classification that a state
could not constitutionally apply).
232 See also text accompanying notes 303-09 infra.
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respect-an ambiguity that appears as early as Parden and which has
not yet been resolved. In upholding Congress' imposition of suit
upon states in the FELA, the Parden Court said that the case was
"distinctly unlike Hans v. Louisiana"2 33 and that the Hans result
was undisturbed. In Hans v. Louisiana2 34 the Court had held that
sovereign immunity barred a contract clause action to recover on
state bond coupons that the state had refused to honor. The reasoning of Parden (and of the subsequent cases suggesting that Congress
can impose suit upon the states) would seem to throw Hans' holding
into question, for consent to suit could be attributed to the state in
Hans in the same ways it was in Parden. The PardenCourt upheld
imposition of the FELA upon the states because "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress
the power to regulate commerce," 235 and because the State of
Alabama had consented to suit when it began operating an interstate
railroad after enactment of the FELA. 238 In Hans, one could say as
readily that the states surrendered their immunity when they ratified
the contract clause; or, if one prefers the second Parden rationale,
that the state consented to suit when it issued bonds subsequent to
the Constitution's ratification. Thus consent in Hans would seem
as genuine as it was in Parden.23 7
Given the Court's conception of sovereign immunity as a constitutionally imposed doctrine, there is a problem with allowing
Parden's reasoning to carry over to Hans: If Parden were deemed
to disturb the Hans result, sovereign immunity would truly be
denied any effect as a constitutional doctrine.238 In the exercise of
its regulatory powers, Congress could impose suit upon the states,
and courts may find implied causes of action against the states in selfexecuting constitutional provisions; the situation would seem exactly
the same as if sovereign immunity had no constitutional force be377 U.S. at 186.
134 U.S. 1 (1890)
238 377 U.S. at 191.
238 Id. 192.
237 In Government Employees, Justice Marshall recognizes and describes well
the seeming conflict between Hans and Parden. 411 U.S. at 292 n.8 (concurring
opinion). He reconciles the cases, however, on the ground that there was consent
to suit in Parden and not in Hans. Justice Marshall does not explain why Parden's
reasoning would not support consent in Hans as well.
238Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883), the ease most noted for the
holding that federal question cases are not excepted from the operation of the
eleventh amendment, would be overturned along with Hans; Jumel like Hans was
a contract clause case. It alone did not dictate the Hans result only because Jumel
was a "true" eleventh amendment case, a noncitizen suit, whereas Hans was a suit
by the state's own citizens.
233
234
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hind it.239 Not only would other constitutional and congressional
rules predominate over states' immunity in the federal question area,
but outside the federal question area-in controversies in which state
law controls-state rules of sovereign immunity apply, not rules derived from the eleventh amendment. 240 There would therefore be
no private suits against stares in which a constitutional rule of sovereign immunity deriving from the eleventh amendment could
apply.
The Court in Parden suggested several reasons why its holding
left Hans unaffected:
This case is distinctly unlike Hans v. Louisiana,
where the action was a contractual one based on state bond
coupons, and the plaintiff sought to invoke the federalquestion jurisdiction by alleging an impairment of the
obligation of contract.3 Such a suit on state debt obligations without the State's consent was precisely the "evil"
against which both the Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were directed.
Here, for the first time in this Court, a State's claim of
immunity against suit by an individual meets a suit
brought upon a cause of action expressly created by Congress ...
3. Of the other cases cited in which federal-question jurisdiction
was asserted, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, and Ex parte New York,
256 U.S. 490, were also commonplace suits in which the federal question
did not itself give rise to the alleged cause of action against the State
but merely lurked in the background. The former case was a taxrefund suit brought by receivers of a corporation created by Congress,
and the latter was an admiralty suit for property damage due to negligence. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, was a suit against the State
to restrain it from enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment to the24Federal
Constitution, on the ground that the Amendment was invalid. 1
239 Iassume that, as is the case today, state consent is either deemed unnecessary or is invariably inferred. But cf. text accompanying notes 71-79 supra.
240See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1964);
Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960); Burnham v. Department of Public
Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197
F. Supp. 23, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). See also notes 92-94 supra & accompanying
text. The rule that state law governs sovereign immunity in these cases has, however, prevailed only since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior to
that decision, there would have been some scope for operation of a constitutional
immunity doctrine, even if it did not apply in federal question cases; it could have
applied to common law causes of action, prohibiting the federal judiciary from
altering sovereign immunity. If this had been the intended scope of a constitutional doctrine of immunity, the doctrine would be obsolete today, but would
have had some purpose prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. For further discussion of
this possibility, see note 272 infra & accompanying text.
241 377 U.S. at 186-87.
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The first reconciliation the Court suggests (in both the text and
the accompanying footnote)-that Hans was not a federal question
case at all-is erroneous. While one might deem suits based upon
the contract clause of the Constitution to "arise under" state contract law rather than under the Federal Constitution, 242 the Supreme
Court has not adopted this position. Instead the suits have been
considered within the federal question jurisdiction as suits to enjoin
state officers from impairing the obligation of contracts, 243 or as suits
"necessarily involv[ing] a question under [the] Federal Constitution
or laws"; 244 they have been barred from federal court only on a
245
view that sovereign immunity prohibited them.
Moreover, to distinguish Parden from Hans on the ground that
Hans was not a "true" federal question case implies that "true"
federal question cases are not subject to sovereign immunity restrictions. This is the position that would leave sovereign immunity
meaningless as a constitutional doctrine today,246 and it is also a
position that the Court has long rejected. 247 The Court disavowed
it again in Parden, in the paragraph immediately preceding the one
242

When,
See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
because of lack of diversity or other federal jurisdictional basis, plaintiffs were left to
litigation in state courts, and state courts invoked state sovereign immunity to bar
them, then the United States Supreme Court could review whether the state could
constitutionally invoke immunity, in view of the Federal Constitution's contract
clause.
243 See, e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
244 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 4, 10 (1890).
245 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 10:
That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State, or of a
foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, is clearly established by the
decisions of this court in several recent cases. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443.
Those were cases arising under the Constitution of the United States, upon
laws complained of as impairing the obligation of contracts, one of which
was the constitutional amendment of Louisiana complained of in the present case. Relief was sought against state officers who professed to act in
obedience to those laws. This court held that the suits were virtually
against the States themselves and were consequently violative of the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, and could not be maintained.
It was not denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution;
but, notwithstanding that, they were held to be prohibited by the amendment referred to.
Similarly, at least two of the cases the Court discusses in the Parden footnote
quoted above, text accompanying note 241, were "true" federal question cases.
Ex parte New York was a maritime case in which federal law clearly governed;
the Court's description of Duhne itself reveals that the federal cause of action
there was at the forefront of that case.
2 46
See text accompanying notes 238-40 supra.
247
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882). But see Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (eleventh amendment does not bar
federal question cases).
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in which it distinguished Hans: "Nor is the State divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.' "248 In short, the first
suggested distinction between Hans and Parden, turning upon
whether Hans was a "true" federal question case, is difficult to
understand and does not make sense.
Another of the Court's distinctions, 2 9 emphasizing that Parden
is the first Supreme Court case involving a clash between state immunity and "a cause of action expressly created by Congress," 20 is
often seen as the reconciling factor between the cases. Justice
Brennan has defended this distinction,251 and two leading articles on
sovereign immunity adopt it as a cornerstone of eleventh amendment interpretation.0 2 The distinction would suggest that somehow Congress is peculiarly empowered to create causes of action
against states, and that federal statutory enactments accordingly can
accomplish more in this respect than constitutional provisions (such
as the contract clause, involved in Hans).
At first blush, the distinction would seem difficult to defend.
There is, of course, the difference that Congress has acted in the
instance of enactments and has not in the instance of self-executing
constitutional provisions. But that fact would generally not seem
to warrant different treatment. As a general matter, if a statute can
accomplish something, a self-executing constitutional provision
could as well. As Justice Marshall says in Government Employees:
248 377 U.S. at 186 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 10).

The cases

the Court cites for this proposition are Hans and the three others which, in its
footnote 3, it describes as not "true" federal question casesi

See note 245 and

text accompanying note 241 supra. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882), the
case typically cited for the proposition that federal question cases are not excepted
from sovereign immunity, in fact supports that proposition only to the same extent
that Hans does: both cases are contract clause actions.
249The third reason the Court gives--that contract clause actions were "precisely the evil" at which the sovereign immunity doctrines were aimed-is similar
to the one I suggest is appropriate. It is discussed in text accompanying notes

276-89 infra.
250 See text accompanying note 241 supra.
25

1Justice Brennan describes the distinction as one between "enumerated

powers granted by the States to the National Government, such as the commerce
power" and "self-imposed prohibitions, as in the case of the Contract Clause."
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. at 319 n.7 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). He does not explain,
however, why enforcement powers cannot be inferred directly from constitutional
provisions. See note 253 infra & accompanying text. See also text accompanying
notes 276-89 infra.
252 Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HASv.
L. BEv. 682 (1976); Nowak, supra note 96.
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[T]he only difference between the Contract Clause and
congressionally created causes of action is that the Contract
Clause is self-enforcing, see, e.g. Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 122, 197-200 (1819); it requires no congressional
act to make its guarantee enforceable in a judicial suit. It
seems to me a strange hierarchy that would provide a
greater opportunity to enforce congressionally created
rights than constitutionally guaranteed rights in federal
court ...

253

One would expect, then, that a theory of unfettered congressional
power would lead into a theory that federal question cases generally
are excepted from sovereign immunity restrictions.
Although it is strange to our constitutional system for a constitutional provision to be unable to accomplish what a statute can,
that result would be plausible if the policy of the eleventh amendment were to limit the judiciary while imposing no limitations upon
Congress. 254 To distinguish thus between federal statutory and
constitutional enactments is in effect to distinguish between congressional and judicial power. A rule that Congress can impose suit
upon the states but that constitutional provisions cannot be interpreted to do the same thing, in the absence of congressional implementation, is a rule limiting the possibilities for judicial discovery
of federal causes of action. The clear language rule, governing
judicial interpretation of congressional enactments, was to the same
effect: Congress can impose suit upon the states, but the judiciary is
not free to find congressional imposition except when Congress
speaks in the clearest terms. Moreover, Edelman's holding that the
eleventh amendment precludes the judiciary from ordering retroactive monetary relief payable by the states in the absence of con253 Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 292 n.8 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Hill,
ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 Commivr. L. RIv. 1109, 1158 (1969) ("[T]he federal and
state courts, insofar as their ordinary jurisdiction and remedial authority are adequate to the occasion, are obliged to afford such remedies as are determined, ultimately by the Supreme Court, to be appropriate in the implementation of the
Constitution. Legislation specifically directing or authorizing such implementation
is no more necessary in the case of the Constitution than in the case of statutes.").
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (anomalous to give federal courts
greater freedom to develop remedies for statutory violations than for constitutional
violations).
2t4 Proponents of this view of the eleventh amendment might profitably analogize their position to the view the Court has taken of the commerce clause. There
the Court has struck down state enactments as unconstitutional burdens upon
interstate commerce, saying that nonetheless congressional legislation can allow the
states to impose the burdens. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
But see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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gressional authorization is similar in this respect. All three rules
give some effect to sovereign immunity as a constitutional doctrine
by having the eleventh amendment curtail judicial discovery of
causes of action against states, 255 even though the amendment does
not limit Congress' powers.
The dichotomy between congressional and judicial power does
serve to reconcile the cases: the older cases, upholding immunity,
were suits brought under federal constitutional provisions, while
the more recent ones are statutory and recognize congressionalpower
to impose suit on states. It is not clear, however, from the holdings
to date, whether the Court's eleventh amendment position ultimately rests upon such a dichotomy or not. If it did, state consent
would no longer be an issue in congressional enactment cases; sovereign immunity would never prevent Congress from imposing suit
on states; and not even a fictional consent would be required.
Espousal of that dichotomy would be a means of giving some force
to the eleventh amendment, while at the same time giving full play
to congressional power to impose suit upon states.
There is a weakness in the argument, however: 256 Nothing in
the eleventh amendment supports the view that it was intended only
to affect the powers of the judiciary and not those of Congress.
Although the language of the amendment refers only to "the judicial
power ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to . . . . 257), such language is generally deemed to
limit Congress along with the courts; if a given controversy is outside of the federal judicial power, accepted doctrine is that Congress
cannot confer jurisdiction of that controversy upon the judiciary,
any more than the judiciary can hear it on its own motion.258
Two strong advocates of differentiating between congressional
and judicial power to hold states accountable in private suits are
259
Both
Professor John Nowak and Professor Laurence Tribe.
255 For a fuller formulation of the Court's limitations upon the judiciary, see
note 319 infra & accompanying text.
256 Another weakness in the argument is that the dichotomy is very difficult to
apply in practice. See text accompanying notes 290-99 infra.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
58 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Cf. National Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1949) (plurality opinion
states that "[i~t is too late to hold that judicial functions incidental to Art. I powers
of Congress cannot be conferred on courts existing under Art. I .... ." but a
majority of the Court, in two separate opinions, rejects that position).
259 Nowak, supra note 96; Tribe, supra note 252. The way Professor Nowak
frequently states his theory is to emphasize that, under the eleventh amendment,
Congress has power to create federal causes of action against the states while the
257
2

judiciary does not.

Nowak, supra note 96, at 1422.

The position that Congress
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ground their argument primarily upon considerations of federalism.
They believe that Congress is better suited than the judiciary to
adjust the federal-state balance involved in decisions whether states
has the power is not self-evident, and is not universally espoused (although the
Supreme Court has adopted it), and the case Professor Nowak makes for congressional power is therefore an interesting and valuable one. I question, however, the
basis for his negation of judicial power, because I believe that immunity is a common law issue. Professor Tribe at one point seems to agree with the common law
view of immunity, rather than with Professor Nowak, for he says that all the
eleventh amendment did was "scuttl[e] the notion that article III had the selfexecuting effect of abrogating state sovereign immunity in federal tribunals." Tribe,
supra note 252, at 694. That position would not have the Constitution confer on
the states any "rights" of sovereign immunity; under a common law view, sovereign
immunity would limit neither congressional nor judicial power (except, of course,
for the limitation that the judiciary should not interpret article III to abrogate
sovereign immunity). Elsewhere, however, Professor Tribe adopts the Congressjudiciary dichotomy and speaks of "distinguish[ing] rights conferred against the
federal judiciary from rights conferred against Congress." Id. 693. See also id.
694 (the amendment "literally limits only the judicial power"). He also advocates
a "clear statement" approach, which limits judicial powers without limiting congressional ones (except congressional power to impose suits upon states by other
than explicit language).
Professor Nowak, by contrast, clearly and consistently states that the eleventh
amendment does limit judicial but not congressional power. But some of the
examples that he provides of the ways in which the eleventh amendment limits
judicial power in fact do not show any limitations on the judiciary that would not
exist even without the eleventh amendment. For example, Professor Nowak states,
in the course of developing his thesis, that "the Federalists believed that Congress
could grant jurisdiction to federal courts in suits against states, although they disclaimed any inherent power of the judiciary to assume such jurisdiction." Nowak,
supra note 96, at 1430. The situation he thus describes is the situation generally
with respect to federal courts' jurisdiction; the jurisdiction is only as broad as
congressional grants and includes no "inherent power" in the judiciary "to assume
... jurisdiction." See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The statement adds something only if it
means simply that article III did not, of its own force, make it unconstitutional for
a state immunity doctrine to persist (which is the interpretation of the Constitution's sovereign immunity provisions that a common law view of immunity makes).
Elsewhere, as well, when Professor Nowak speaks of the eleventh amendment
limiting judicial power to create causes of action against the states, or to assume
jurisdiction on its own of suits against the states, Nowak, supra note 96, at 1422,
he seems to describe limitations on the federal judiciary that exist independent of
eleventh amendment policy. He may, however, be referring to the special rules
the Court has found limiting usual judicial interpretive functions in this area. See
text accompanying notes 254-55 supra; text accompanying notes 317-18 infra. For
a discussion of the difficulties inherent in delineating special limits on the judiciary
but not Congress, see text accompanying notes 290-316 infra.
Professor Tribe does, in advocating a "clear statement approach," put forth a
special limitation on the federal judiciary that might be deemed to stem from the
eleventh amendment. Tribe, supra note 252, at 695. Tribe does not, however,
carry over to interpretation of constitutional provisions his unwillingness to impart
discretion to the judiciary. He finds that "one situation in which judicial abrogation
of sovereign immunity, subject to congressional veto, might be justified" is "[wihen
a court implies a remedy under a constitutional rule that limits both national and
state power." Tribe, supra note 252, at 696 n.73. Query why the "clear statement
approach" need not be followed in constitutional as well as statutory provisions.
See note 309 infra. (Tribe does have a functional explanation for excepting this
class of cases: The federal judiciary would be more sensitive to the interests of
states as states in those cases, because the state interests would be shared by the
federal government Tribe, supra note 252, at 696 n.73.)
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should be accountable to individuals for violations of federal law.
In Professor Nowak's words, "Congress is the only governmental
entity which shares a dual responsibility to the state and federal
systems and is accountable at both levels." 260 In contrast, the federal judiciary is politically isolated and enjoys life tenure. 261
The difficulty with the argument is that it derives from nothing
peculiar to the eleventh amendment. It is an argument for a general
limitation upon judicial power in relation to legislative power, at
least in areas involving federal-state relations. In discussing the
applicability of their argument in the eleventh amendment context,
both authors make the point that nothing in the amendment is inconsistent with such a dichotomy between judicial and legislative
power.262 But they show nothing in either the language or the history of the amendment that affirmatively supports or even suggests
it. 263 In the absence of any affirmative historical support, it would
260 Nowak, supra note 96, at 1441. Professor Tribe makes the same point in
support of congressional power: "lilt has generally been recognized that the states
are represented in Congress and that Congress will be attentive to concerns of state
governments as separate sovereigns." Tribe, supra note 252, at 695. See generally
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 543

(1954).
261 See Nowak, supra note 96, at 1441.
262 Tribe, supra note 252, at 694; Nowak, supra note 96, at 1429-30, 1431-33,
1440-41.
263 Professor Nowak does extensively discuss historical materials-from article
III of the Constitution through passage of the eleventh amendment. He suggests
that the chief concern was judicial, not congressional, imposition of suit against
states, because it was the judiciary that had so ruled in Chisholm. Basically, however, Nowal's argument turns on his view that greater congressional than judicial
policy in the area would be desirable. Nowak, supra note 96, at 1429-42.
In other contexts, as well, Professor Nowak is free in reading constitutional
provisions and constitutional history to accord with his views of policy. Later in
the article Nowak says, "one of the [eleventh] amendment's underlying purposes was
to prohibit the courts from imposing monetary burdens on the states for past
actions." Id. 1444. He goes on to say that "[this prohibition against retroactive
relief is so basic to the eleventh amendment that it should be construed as applying
to congressional enactments, even though the amendment is framed only in terms of
the judicial power." Id.
This suggestion is in derogation of his own general
position that the amendment does not limit congressional power. Nowak offers no
explanation for why "this prohibition against retroactive relief" is more "basic" than
any other, although he does express his own distaste for "hold[ing] the states liable
for actions taken before any branch of the federal government had given them
notice that they would be subject to federal suit for such actions." Id. (Indeed
the language of the amendment does not suggest any prohibition in terms of the
type of relief sought at all.)
Professor Nowak ultimately exposes his own argument when he concludes that
"[the drafters of the amendment probably did not limit congressional power in this
area simply because they did not foresee the creation of retroactive causes of action
by Congress." Id. 1444-45. This seems to concede that the intent of the constitutional prohibition did not encompass these congressional actions, and that Professor Nowak's suggestion that the Constitution be interpreted to outlaw them rests
simply on his own view that they are unsound. Cf. Part One, supra note 1, at
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seem strange to create a rule that is applicable only to this one constitutional amendment, and that permits congressional enactments
but not other constitutional provisions to override it.
V. THE SUGGESTED APPROACH: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A
NON-CONSTrruTTIONAL DOCTRINE

In the first article in this series, I suggested that historical
sources show that neither the eleventh amendment nor article III
had the effect of constitutionalizing the established common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The debate surrounding article III
concerned whether the grant of jurisdiction "to controversies . . .
between a State and Citizens of another State" took away states'
immunity or left it unaffected; there was no suggestion at that time
that the jurisdictional grant conferred a constitutional right of sovereign immunity upon states. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 64 the
Supreme Court held that article III took away states' historical immunity. The effect of the eleventh amendment was to overturn
Chisholm's holding in favor of the other interpretation that had
been suggested for article III, that it left states' immunity unaffected.
What consequences would flow from accepting this view of immunity, and how do they differ from the results the Court has
reached?
A. Consequences for CongressionalPower
If sovereign immunity survives article III but is not required
by it (or by the eleventh amendment), plainly Congress has power
to override states' immunity in the exercise of its regulatory powers.
In respect to congressional power, the results do not differ between
this approach and the theory discussed above that the purpose of the
eleventh amendment does not extend to curtailing congressional (as
opposed to judicial) power; under either view, Congress retains full
freedom of action. Insofar as the Court's holdings do not expressly
rely upon a Congress-judiciary dichotomy, but uphold congressional
power through imputing to states a fictional consent to suit, the
results generally accord with the Court's. The one difference is that
under a non-constitutional view of immunity, it is clear that congressional legislation that is otherwise valid could always impose
522 & nn.32-34 (describing the process by which the eleventh amendment came to
be applied to citizen suits). That being so, Professor Nowak's argument as to the
propriety of actions for retroactive monetary relief should be addressed to Congress;
the eleventh amendment does not remove Congress' power to impose the suits.
2642 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
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suit upon states; 265 under the Court's holdings, it is not clear

whether congressional power will be upheld in situations (most
notably regulation of activities central to state's sovereign functions) 266 where it is most difficult to impute a fictional consent to
states and where the congressional regulations are based on powers
other than the spending power or the Civil War amendments.
B. Consequences for Federal JudicialPower
It is more difficult to ascertain what power the suggested approach leaves to the federal courts to affect sovereign immunity.
Generally one would expect that if immunity survives only as a
common law doctrine, it would be fully subject to judicial as well
as legislative development. As the following discussion will show,
however, some restraints on judicial development, or at least abrogation, of immunity are necessarily implicit, and others are at least
possible, even if article III and the eleventh amendment do not
impose immunity as a constitutional requirement.
1. Is the Federal Judiciary Free to Abrogate States' Immunity, on
the Basis of its Own Notions of Policy?-The Possibility
of a General "Freeze" on Judicial Development
of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Is the federal judiciary free itself to abrogate immunity in the
first instance? Today it is not unusual for state judiciaries, acting
as common law courts, to reject established sovereign immunity
doctrine as "an anachronism without rational basis." 267 Did the
265

The same is true under a Congress-judiciary dichotomy.

266 It may also be unclear when state undertaking of the activity has preceded

congressional regulation. See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 supra.
267 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 388, 381 P.2d 107, 109
(1963) (abolishing government immunity in tort). For other judicial rejections of
sovereign immunity, see Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
modified sub nom. Coming Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 482, 370 P.2d
325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1961); Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (commented upon in
9 DEPAUL L. PEv. 39 (1959)); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733
(1972); Klepinger v. Board of Comm., 143 Ind. App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160 (1968);
Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 622, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967);
Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969) (immunity reinstated in-part,
KAxs. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-901-902 (1973), held unconstitutional in Brown v. Wichita
State Univ., 217 Kan. 279, 540 P.2d 66 (1975), rev'd on rehearing, 219 Kan. 2,
547 P.2d 1015 (1976)); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961) (immunity reinstated in MicH. STAT. ANN. §3.996(101)-(115) (1977);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34
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Constitution, by leavirig sovereign immunity in common law status,
allow the federal judiciary as well to repudiate the rule? (Since the
1938 decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,268 such a federal judicial
power would in any event be limited to areas in which federal law
controls, but during some pre-Erie periods the federal judiciary
participated along with state judiciaries in the development or discovery of the common law in instances where state law now controls.)

209

It would seem anomalous to maintain staunchly that the

Constitution did not abrogate immunity of its own force while at
the same time entertaining a view that the federal judiciary could
accomplish the same result, not by constitutional interpretation but
in service of its own notions of policy.
Such a problem with preserving immunity only as a common
law doctrine would not have been apparent when the Constitutionor the eleventh amendment-was adopted. For it was not then
anticipated that the judiciary-state or federal-would freely develop
common law in a way familiar to us today. At that time the prevalent concept of the common law was of one unitary system, which
courts were to discover, not to create.270 A more realistic view of
judicial functions might have led one to expect that judges would
inevitably develop sovereign immunity doctrine-and that they
would do so in some ways that did not preserve every possible means
of state immunity from suit. 271 But while fine distinctions might
have been expected, bold changes of course were not.
Arguably the view of the judicial function contemporary with
the ratification of article III and the adoption of the eleventh amendment, together with the purposes of those provisions, supports a
position "freezing" common law development in federal courts.
(1970) (reinstated for two years in N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:4A-1 (Supp. 1977); Hicks
v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1976); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17
WVis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419
(Wyo. 1976). Compare Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960) with
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582
(1957).
It is sometimes said, however, that only state legislatures should waive immunity, and that courts should not. E.g., Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d
832, 836 (1952).
208304 U.S. 64 (1938).
269 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
270 See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842); W. CRossKEY, Pormncs AND THE
CoNsTrrunox N THE HisTORY OF THE UN=rED STATES ch. XVMI (1953); 1
D. HoFsrAN, COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 415-16 (2d ed. 1836).
271

See note 273 infra.
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The result would be that sovereign immunity doctrine even today
could be developed or abrogated only by Congress or by state legislatures and judiciaries, but not by the federal judiciary. In effect,
then, the position would be the same as the Congress-judiciary
dichotomy discussed above, unless the freeze were not deemed to
272
extend to federal question cases.
Such a freeze on federal judicial development of the sovereign
immunity doctrine would be extremely difficult to apply, for preConstitution sovereign immunity doctrine did not offer dispositive
solutions to many problems that would arise. Federal courts did in
fact substantially develop the contours of sovereign immunity doctrine during the nineteenth century, laying down not only rules
regarding immunity that were more expansive than might have
273
been expected but also some that were more narrow.
Moreover, it is unnecessary to impose a freeze on federal judicial interpretation of sovereign immunity in order to avoid federal
272 Even if the Constitution were deemed to freeze federal judicial development
of common law sovereign immunity, it is not clear whether that would affect the
disposition of sovereign immunity problems today. Any such freeze might well
have been deemed to apply only in cases involving common law causes of action,
which constituted a substantial amount of the federal judicial business during the
nineteenth century, and not in the federal question area. If so, the sovereign immunity doctrine would in that respect be obsolete today, since the federal judiciary
now follows state decisional and statutory law in those cases. Erie R.R. v. TompIn any event that exemption of federal question
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
litigation from sovereign immunity doctrine would be possible only if contract clause
actions were not deemed federal question cases, because it is clear that a chief
concern of proponents of state immunity was actions against states to enforce debts.
See note 281 infra & accompanying text. Although contract clause actions became
firmly established during the nineteenth century as suits arising under the Constitution (though barred by sovereign immunity), it was not self-evident that they
would have been deemed federal question cases; they could equally have been
conceived of as suits upon the contract. See notes 242-45 supra & accompanying
text. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), would not compel that
contract clause actions be treated as federal question cases. It was not treated as
a contract clause action, or as a federal question case in any other respect. The
jurisdictional basis there was that the suit was between a state and a citizen of
another state. See note 311 infra. The eleventh amendments overturning of
Chisholm is therefore consistent with a view of the amendment as limiting judicial
creative functions in areas we now see as controlled by state law and as not carrying
over to federal question cases, as long as actions alleging state impairment of
contracts are not seen as federal question cases. See notes 242-45 supra & accompanying text.
If the Constitution were deemed to freeze federal judicial development of the
common law relating to sovereign immunity, and if the freeze were deemed to
cover federal question cases as well as common law causes of action, the result
would be the same as the Congress-judiciary dichotomy discussed above. If, on
the other hand, the concern was with common law causes of action and not federal
question cases (except suits to enforce state debts), that freeze on the common law
would be without effect today.
273 For example, cases allowing suit against individual officers and allowing
people to recover their own property. E.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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judicial abrogation of the immunity doctrine. Federal judicial
abrogation is not a realistic possibility because of the view the
Supreme Court has taken of the federal judicial role in formulating
federal common law generally. The Court has not claimed for the
federal judiciary a role in evolving federal common law equal to the
common law making powers of state judiciaries; the federal judiciary does not assume full rule-making power simply because an
area is one in which Congress could have acted but has not. Only
in a few areas, none of which is relevant here,2 74 does the federal
judiciary exercise full rule-making power. Otherwise it has limited
itself to "interstitial federal lawmaking"-to filling in gaps in constitutional schemes or in statutory schemes largely formulated by
Congress.2 7 5 Absent a freeze, then, judicial interpretation and development of the common law immunity doctrine is to be expected,
but judicial abrogation is not.
In any event, it would seem erroneous to impose a freeze on
federal judicial development of the common law of immunity simply
because the Framers entertained a different view of the judicial
function (as it relates to immunity and to all other common law
questions as well) than we do today. A sounder approach would
stress that the attitudes reflected in the eleventh amendment, and in
the interpretation of article III thereby adopted, counsel restraint
on the part of the federal judiciary in imposing new and different
remedies against the states. Moreover, they are not alone in counseling restraint. Even if the Constitution as such does not stand
behind the sovereign immunity doctrine-so that article III and the
eleventh amendment limit neither congressional nor judicial functions in relation to suits against states-the special rules constraining
the federal judiciary that the Court has derived from the eleventh
amendment could stand, though with a different theoretical basis.
2. Will the Suggested Approach Impose on the Federal Judiciary
the Same Restraints That the Court's Approach Has?
a. Hans v. Louisiana and Other Contract Clause Cases-Finding
Private Causes of Action Against States Implied in
ConstitutionalProvisions
If the Court were to view sovereign immunity as solely a common law requirement, it could nevertheless allow Hans v. Louisiana
See note 291 infra.
See generally United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,
591-93 (1973); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 797, 800 (1957).
274
2715
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to stand, although not because of any dichotomy between constitutional provisions and congressionally-created causes of action. A
common law approach to immunity permits the judiciary to find a
private cause of action flowing from federal constitutional provisions
or statutes, when the cause of action accords with the purposes of
the particular provision. The holding in Hans v. Louisiana can,
and probably should, be maintained; but the holding flows from the
27
contract clause, not from the eleventh amendment.
There is an argument suggesting that the contract clause does
contemplate private enforcement suits against states: such suits are
essential for the provision to have effect. The contract clause, which
provides that "[n]o State shall .

.

. pass any . . . Law impairing

the Obligation of Contracts," 277 was undoubtedly intended to limit
states. The Court in Chisholm v. Georgia278 and Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting in Louisiana v. Jumel2 79 (the case first holding
that sovereign immunity bars private actions under the contract
clause) thought that contract clause actions against the state must
necessarily be permissible; otherwise, the clause would be ineffec0
tive.28
Nonetheless, the position the Court has consistently taken-that
contract clause claims can be raised only defensively--best accords
with the Framers' intent. In the ratification debates on the original
Constitution, state suability was much discussed. Objections to it
focused principally upon the undesirability of holding states to their
debts, as contract clause actions would do.281 The provision some
276 This approach makes it irrelevant whether the suit is a citizen suit or a
non-citizen suit. Therefore, Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1884), stands on
the same footing as Hans.
277 U.S. CONST. art.

L § 10.

U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
107 U.S. 711, 748 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

2782
279
2 80

The clause still could and can be raised defensively, however, and the line
between a defensive and an affirmative use is not a clear one. See, e.g., Pennoyer
v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
The other prohibitions upon the states contained in article I, section ten do
not raise the same problem. As to most, one would not imagine that the plaintiff
would be a private individual. Other prohibitions might be adequately enforced
if raised defensively by private individuals.
281 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) 511-12 (B. Wright ed.
1961) (1st ed. 1788) (quoted in Part One, supra note 1, at 529); 3 THE DERBATEs
IN TniE SEVERAL STATE CoNvzNONs ON THE ADoPEON OF THE FEDERAL CoNsT-

318-19, 471, 473-76 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (remarks of Patrick Henry, quoted
in part in Part One, supra note 1, at 532). Cf. 1 C. WARRzN, THE SUPREME Cotm=
TUTION

STATES HIsTORy 99 (1922)

(speaking of the reaction to Chisholm).
SovEmRGN imnnry 22
(1972) ("[T]he framers of the Constitution attached utmost importance to the
fidelity of financial obligations, both public and private.
). But cf. id. 69-70,
74 (discussing the eleventh amendment).
in UNrrED

But see C. JAcojs, THE ErvErN

AMENDMENT Atm
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looked to as accomplishing this result was the judicial power language in article III; some thought it abrogated states' sovereign
immunity generally in suits in federal court. This is the interpretation of article III that Chisholm upheld and that the eleventh
amendment rejected. 2 2 No one intimated, however, either in the
debates on the original Constitution, or at any time prior to passage
of the eleventh amendment, that the contract clause of its own force
might have the effect of removing states' immunity. Given this
history, it would be strange indeed to find an implied right of action
in the contract clause that would accomplish precisely what the
eleventh amendment repudiated for article III, and that would remove states' immunity in suits to enforce debts-an area of central
concern in 1789 when the Constitution was ratified, and again when
the eleventh amendment was adopted. It would mean that the
ratification debates, Chisholm, and the eleventh amendment had
simply focused on the wrong constitutional provision, and that the
contract clause all along had by itself accomplished what was most
feared.
Since the question whether the contract clause of its own force
entails a private cause of action against states is a question of the
intent behind the contract clause, this history supports an interpretation that no such cause of action exists. Instead, the contract
clause leaves states' immunity unaffected; the immunity persists, in
suits on state obligations, as a common law doctrine. But the fact
that the history and deliberations support this interpretation of the
contract clause does not mean, of course, that every other constitutional provision must similarly be interpreted to maintain states'
immunity from suit. Each constitutional provision poses a separate
interpretive question. The commerce clause, for example, has been
interpreted to contemplate congressional imposition of suit upon
states, though not to impose suit of its own force. 2 8 One constitutional provision that might be held, of its own force, to modify
common law immunity is section one of the fourteenth amendment,28 although the Court suggested in Edelman v. Jordan that it
See Part One, supra note 1, at 527-46.
Parden v. Terminal By., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
2 4
8 Indeed, that result could obtain even if the eleventh amendment were
deemed to impose immunity as a constitutional requirement; as a subsequent
amendment, the fourteenth could modify the eleventh. Professor Nowak, in fact,
has taken the position that section one of the fourteenth amendment has that effect.
See Nowak, supra note 96, at 1455-60. The Court has viewed section five of the
fourteenth amendment as modifying the eleventh, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976), but it does not view section one as modifying the eleventh,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
282
283
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would not follow that interpretation. 2 s It may be that no constitutional provision, or at least none existing prior to the adoption of
the eleventh amendment, 286 will be interpreted to alter common law
immunity and impose suit on states of its own force. The same history that supports Hans' interpretation of the contract clause could
support a theory that plaintiffs could not use other pre-eleventh
amendment provisions to enforce debts against the states. Possibly
the theory could even be extended beyond debts, to any monetary
liability against the states.287 To the extent, however, that a given
provision is more specific in contemplating monetary liability, or
less far-reaching in allowing it,288 the Court might reach a result
different from the contract clause cases. In any event, the results
reached would obtain as a matter of interpretation of each constitutional provision, 2 9 and not because the eleventh amendment creates
a bar to federal judicial recognition of private actions against states
that are implicit in constitutional guarantees.
b. The Prohibition Against Implication of Retroactive Monetaly
Relief Against States and the Clear Language Rule
In contrast to the rule of Hans v. Louisiana, it is not clear to
me that the Edelman v. Jordan rule and the clear language rule
285 See text accompanying notes 125-26, 169 & 173 supra. The result of
Edelman is that a federal court cannot recognize a damage remedy against states
in actions brought under the fourteenth amendment, except where Congress has
authorized damages. In that case, the suit is under section five, which does modify
the eleventh amendment.
286This is relevant because later ones could be modifiers. Moreover, the
history contemporary with ratification, suggesting concern with suits to enforce debts
against the states, is some evidence that constitutional provisions then in existence
other than article III were also not deemed of their own force to subject states to
monetary liability. The argument made in text with respect to the contract clause
could thereby be applied to all pre-eleventh amendment constitutional provisions.
2 87
But c. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (holding fifth amendment gives private party a right of action against the United States for just compensation for the taking of his or her property). Moreover, in Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Fla. 1977), appeal pending, No. 77-1846
(5th Cir., oral argument scheduled for June, 1978), the court held that Congress
can use its article I war powers, U.S. Cous. art I, § 8, cl. 12, to abrogate states'
immunity and to make states amenable to private damage actions without the
need for any enforcement clause.
288 See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (fifth amendment
just compensation clause). See also Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261
U.S. 299, 304 (1923) ("Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and
the right to it cannot be taken away by statute.").
289 Justice Brennan's Government Employees opinion, 411 U.S. at 319 n.7,
may similarly reflect a view that the Court, in deciding whether enforcement powers
were granted to Congress, should look to the purpose of each particular constitutional provision. Justice Brennan does not, however, mention the possibility of
implied remedies against states found directly in constitutional provisions.
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should obtain, at least if they are interpreted strictly. If those rules
ate deemed desirable, however, there are bases other than a constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine on which they can rest; the
results need not necessarily change if immunity is deemed only a
common law doctrine.
The Edelman rule that the judiciary should not imply retroactive monetary relief against states may not be the same as the clear
language rule,20 0 but at least it is closely related to it. Both are
essentially rules of strict construction, to be applied to enactments
arguably conferring federal jurisdiction of suits against states. The
Edelman rule is a rule of construction because any rule limiting
judicial recognition of implied remedies is. The federal judiciary
claims a power to make true "federal common law" only in a few
classes of cases, none of which is relevant here. 291 When the judiciary finds an implied remedy of damages against a state in other
classes of cases, it is not acting fully as a common law court; it is intepreting a constitutional provision or a statute. The line between
judicial interpretation and judicial lawmaking is not an easy or
clearcut one. The Court's announcement of the exclusionary rule
in Mapp v. Ohio,29 2 for example, resembles federal common law in
some ways. It represents judicial implementation of the fourth and
fifth amendments in a way that was not directly suggested by the
amendments' language. But in another way Mapp represents an interpretation of the fourth amendment (and the fifth amendment).
If one had a system prohibiting common law making by the federal
judiciary but retaining judicial construction of constitutional provisions and statutes, it is not clear that there would not still be decisions like Mapp. 29 3 Questions would arise concerning statutory
enactments or constitutional provisions that give no apparent guid290 See text accompanying notes 208, 209 & 212 supra.
291 E.g., controversies to which the United States is a party (Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); United States v. County
of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 181-83 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447
(1942)); international law (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 393
(1964)); controversies between states (Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 671 (1965);
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938));
admiralty (Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-11 (1953); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917)); suits brought under section 301 of the National
Labor Relations Act (Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)).
292367 U.S. 643 (1961).
292 Another example of creative constitutional interpretation not directly suggested by constitutional language but not fully federal common law is Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in
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ance on the point at issue.294 The point is simply that it is difficult
to separate those instances in which courts are acting in furtherance
of congressional (or constitutional) policy from those in which they
are acting as policy-makers themselves.
The court of appeals in Edelman did not hold that it had power
to grant the requested relief despite contrary legislative intent. Instead it thought the relief consistent with the Social Security Act.295
which the Supreme Court found a damage remedy, deriving from the fourth amendment, in suits against federal officers.
J.L Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) is a statutory case in which an implied
damage remedy was found (under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1970)).
For authorities on the propriety of finding implied remedies in the Constitution,
see note 253 supra. Another case finding a remedy implicit in a constitutional
guarantee is Ex parte Young, allowing injunctive relief against state officials charged
with violating the Constitution. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
294 Normally in deciding a question concerning a congressional enactment (such
as the issue whether a particular remedy is available for a statutory violation),
the judiciary, finding congressional intent uncertain, would follow "the better rule"
in all the circumstances. It does this by itself deciding what purposes ought to be
attributed to the statute and what resolution those purposes call for. H. HART &
A. SAcKs, Tim LEGAL PRocEss 1410-11, 1414-15 (tent. ed. 1958). The rule thus
formulated will stand until Congress acts to modify it. The judiciary does not,
however, act without restraints. Even without definitive indications of "congressional intent," a court should reason from the statutory purposes and not from its
own notions of preferable policy when it makes its decisions; it must, in other
words, "respect the position of the legislature as the chief policy-determining agency
of the society." Id. 1410. See generally id. 1414-15; Hill, The Brie Doctrine and
The Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 440-44 (1958); Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. 11Ev. 1024,
1026-28 (1967). See also Wellington, supra note 230, at 262-64. Nonetheless, the
absence of clear indications in a congressional enactment, or accompanying legislative history, does give the judiciary considerable freedom in interpreting "congressional intent."
295 It is inferable from the purpose of Congressional enactment of the
AABD program that effective judicial review might include 5 the remedy of
Otherwise a
restoration of benefits withheld in violation of federal law.'
state could engage in practices which would deny eligible recipients the
full measure of that assistance which Congress has intended for them "at
the minimal risk of a subsequent finding of unconstitutionality [or illegality]
(if indeed it is challenged) which finding would come only some time
later after the case had gone the judicial route and which would deny
retroactive relief thus giving the state the desired effect and savings at
least during the period of [their] existence." Alexander v. Weaver, 345
F. Supp. 666, 673 (N.D. 111973); see also Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317
F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (W.D. Wis.1970). Certainly we are not to be
understood as meaning that retrospective relief is alway [sic] or even
generally an appropriate remedy. However, the spectre of a state, perhaps
calculatingly, defying federal law and thereby depriving welfare recipients
of the financial assistance Congress thought it was giving them convinces
us that Congress fully meant to condition the grant of federal funds on the
states' being susceptible to a federal court suit to obtain retrospective
relief. Simply put, we think it unreasonable to presume that Congress
would have intended assistance to be given to welfare recipients in conformity with federal law and at the same time deny them the possibility
of gaining an effective remedy. See Employees of Dept. of Public Health
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 831
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In reversing and in holding that the judiciary should not find implied damage remedies against states, the Supreme Court essentially
held that there must at least be language literally imposing suit
8 for states to be found liable under federal enactupon the states 21
ments for retroactive monetary relief. Generally it might be possible
for the federal judiciary to find a damage remedy in an enactment that did not explicitly provide or deny the remedy; if the
judiciary thought that the purposes of the enactment required the
remedy, and that nothing in the enactment or the legislative history
suggested that the remedy was not consistent with the legislative
intent, the judiciary would have power to grant that relief.297 Edelman precludes such judicial interpretation of an enactment, when
the result is to hold states to retroactive monetary relief, unless language in the enactment literally imposes suit upon states. The Government Employees clear statement rule goes one step further, maintaining (in the cases to which it applies) 298 that language literally
imposing suit upon the states is not enough but that there must as
well be clear language affirming that the intent is to lift states' immunity.
An essential problem with approaches restricting the federal
judiciary but not restricting Congress is that they are dependent
upon delineating some clear division between judicial interpretation
and judicial lawmaking. They must place special limits upon the
federal judiciary without unduly interfering with federal courts'
interpretive role in enforcing statutory (or constitutional) provisions.
Rules of strict construction, like the Edelman rule and the clear
language rule, are one solution to this problem.
(8th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), certiorari granted, 405 U.S. 1016,
92 S.Ct. 1294, 31 L.Ed.2d 478.
15. The federal regulations governing the federal welfare programs
contemplate court-ordered, retroactive welfare payments by expressly providing for federal financial participation in such corrective payments.

45 C.F.R. §205.10(b)(2)(3).

Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted), rev'd
sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
290 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 672, 674.
297 See notes 253, 287 & 293 supra. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 46 U.S.L.W. 4412 (Sup. Ct. May 15, 1978); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969).
Moreover, the existence of literal language may not make the strongest case for
congressional intent In Parden, for example, the literal language included suits
against states, because the statute was phrased in terms of "every railroad," and the
case concerned a state-owned railroad. But since there were no state-owned railroads serving as common carriers when the FELA was adopted, the judicial interpretation that state railroads were covered was not altogether compelled.
298 See text accompanying notes 220-32 supra.
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Should these rules of strict construction be retained?
In cases in which congressional intent is truly unclear, it is
unobjectionable to have a rule that the judiciary should not find a
private cause of action for damages against states. The Court's rules
cutting back on the usual judicial interpretive function are objectionable only to the extent that they go further and attempt to
prevent the judiciary from finding causes of action against the states
in situations where all the circumstances suggest that such causes of
action are within the statutory purpose. 299 They have this effect
because they prohibit findings of congressional intent except where
that intent has manifested itself in particular forms and is expressed
in particular formulations: They require absolutely that a congressional enactment literally impose suit against the states and, further
they require, in some circumstances, "clear language" showing that
states' immunity from suit was to be lifted. While the Court has
not made clear how strictly this last requirement is to be applied, if
indeed any scope remains for its operation, some advocates of the
requirement have turned it into "a clear statement rule" and have
read it for all it is worth: "[T]he amenability of states to suit must
be specifically addressed by federal legislation, and Congress must
make its intention to treat states like private parties unmistakably
clear." 300 Because it is unrealistic to expect Congress always to have
expressed directly its intent to impose suit on states,301 especially in
statutes enacted prior to Government Employees, courts following
such a clear statement rule would not find private causes of action
299

In the recent argument in the United States Supreme Court of Hutto v.

Finney, 548 F.2d 740 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3261 (No. 76-1660),
argument, 46 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Feb. 28, 1978), counsel for the state took the position
that the congressional enactment involved there (the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 (1970))

did not abrogate states' immunity from attorney's fees awards,

even though, as counsel conceded, the legislative history made clear that Congress
did intend to abrogate states' immunity. The state argued that regardless of congressional intent, Congress had simply "botched the job"; if Congress did not use
explicit language, no abrogation of immunity could be found. 46 U.S.L.W. 3535.
500

Tribe, supra note 252, at 691.

Professor Tribe also says, "By making a

law unenforceable against the states unless a contrary intent were apparent in the
language of the statute, the clear statement rule would . . . ensure that attempts
to limit state power were unmistakable...." Id. 695. See also id.
301 "[TIhe low motive power of abstract sovereign immunity concerns" means
that Congress often will not explicitly discuss whether to impose suit, let alone
include in the legislation a direct statement on the subject, even when its statute
rather clearly has that effect. The quoted language is Professor Tribe's. Id. 696
n.73. He recognizes the point, though in another context, but he is cntent to
have the presumption play a substantive role "thereby structuring the legislative

process to allow the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest opportunity to protect
the states' interests." Id. 695. See generally id. 695-96.
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even in instances in which "all the circumstances" made clear that
state suability was intended.3°2
A clear statement rule, strictly applied, thus leads courts to deny
causes of action that were intended by Congress. Professor Harry
Wellington has recognized that a function of a clear statement rule
is to allow courts, under the guise of statutory interpretation, to
contravene congressional intent: "The exercise of judicial power
entailed in the application of such a rule is, of course, the exercise
of quasi-constitutional, judicial review. The court, in a mild way,
is resisting legislative purpose. It is interposing itself, in a noncooperative fashion, between the legislature and the people." 303
While the rule appears to be one of judicial restraint, it effectively
gives courts a veto over congressional causes of action, 304 a veto
courts can exercise when congressional intent is clear but the legislation is not absolutely explicit.30 5 The veto can be overridden only
if Congress again considers the issue and states its position with the
necessary specificity.30 6 But such a presumption against a particular
result should arise only when the Court believes that result is in
some way improper-when congressional legislation contravenes
fundamental principles. 30 7 In those instances the Court forces Congress to deliberate upon the specific problem, 308 and to address it as
302

E.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of

Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See also note 299 supra.
303 Wellington, supra note 230, at 264. See also note 301 supra.
304 Wellington also conceives of a clear statement approach as one that "shifts,
or hides, responsibility as between court and legislature." Wellington, supra note
230, at 264.
305
It is hard to believe that the Government Employees Court was not displacing congressional legislation with its own conclusion of policy that "[tlhe policy
of the Act so far as the States are concerned is wholly served by allowing the
delicate federal-state relationship to be managed through the Secretary of Labor."
411 U.S. at 286.
306 Unless Congress makes benefits retroactive to previous legislation, and that
is upheld, many persons will lose benefits irretrievably. For factors reducing the
likelihood that Congress will do so, see Tribe, supra note 252, at 696 n.73. But
when Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to provide explicitly that
employees could maintain actions against state employers, see note 79 supra, it did
extend the statute of limitations to allow refiling by the state employees who had
been denied relief under Government Employees. If the Court were to proceed on
a waiver rationale, in upholding congressional imposition of suits, it might have
difficulty sustaining such retroactive causes of action. See text accompanying notes
108-11 supra. See also Nowak, supra note 96, at 1444.
307 Professor Wellington recognizes this as the function of a clear statement
rule: "The court should assume responsibility by imposing on the legislature a clear
statement rule: to depart from an established principle, the legislature must speak
Legislative power to disregard principles exists in our form of governplainly. ...
ment, but it must be exercised without doubt." Wellington, supra note 230, at 264
(emphasis in original). See also notes 229-32 supra & accompanying text.
308 Professor Tribe believes that a primary purpose of the clear statement rule
is to force Congress directly to have focussed on the issue of states' immunity in
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such, if it is to impose the disfavored approach. Thus the clear
statement rule made sense in Government Employees because the
Court had doubts concerning the constitutionality of the relevant
enactments. But if one accepts congressional power in other circumstances to impose suits on states, it would not be proper to retain
for those enactments rules of strict construction that effectively require departure from congressional intent.30 9
As stated above, the disagreement with the Court's results is
limited to those instances in which the Court's rules of construction
would depart from congressional intent. A rule that in unclear
cases the judiciary should rule against state suability is unobjectionable. Such a rule, which is equivalent to a "clear evidence" requirement, is sufficient to protect against an overenthusiastic judiciary in
this area. By telling courts that in ambiguous cases they should
reject state suability, a clear evidence rule would counsel courts
against finding states suable absent congressional (or constitutional)
intent, just as the Court's rules of strict construction do; but unlike
the Court's rules, it would not require congressional intent to manifest itself in any particular form.3 10 Instead, a requirement that
evidence of congressional intent to impose suit be clear would direct
the judiciary to consider all evidence reflecting upon statutory purpose, in whatever form. It would tell the judiciary that if congressional intent was unclear the judiciary should not make its own best
guess, or its own best policy judgment, but should instead rule
against suability. But while a clear evidence requirement would
order for immunity to be waived. Tribe, supra note 252, at 695 ("[Clourts should
not abrogate state immunity unless they are sure that Congress has considered the
federalism interests compromised by suits against states."). See also Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HAav. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
3 09
The Hans rule as well can be viewed as one of construction: The Court's
retention of Hans and the accompanying distinction between constitutional and
congressionally created causes of action could simply represent a belief that no constitutional provision is explicit enough to support an implication of damages against
states. That rule at least has some specific support: the argument that contemporary
history shows the original Constitution should not be interpreted to allow private
suits to collect on state debts. There is no similar, specific support for rules of strict
construction of congressional enactments imposing suit on states, unless one doubts
congressional power to act in the area.
Although carrying the clear statement rule over to constitutional provisions
could explain Hans, Professor Tribe, an advocate of a clear statement rule for congressional enactments, does not apply the approach to constitutional provisions. See
note 259 supra.
310 A clear evidence approach would thus differ from the Court's approach
because, first, there would be no absolute requirement of language literally imposing
suit upon states as a prerequisite to finding that evidence of congressional intent to
impose suit is clear; second, there would be no clear language rule. (This latter
may not show any significant variation from the Court's holdings because it is
unclear how strictly the Court ever applied its clear language rule and because
the rule operates only in a limited class of cases today.)
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affect the weight of evidence of congressional imposition that the
judiciary should require to find states suable, it would not adopt the

Court's specific rules about how congressional intent must be ascertained.3 1 '
311 There is, however, one specific rule that the historical understanding of
article III and the eleventh amendment does suggest: a rule that a congressional
enactment giving federal courts jurisdiction of suits "between a State and citizens
of another State" (i.e. utilizing the article III language) should not be deemed,
without more, to abrogate states' immunity from suit.
The reasons for this limitation are somewhat complex. It flows from the historical debate concerning whether or not article III abrogated states' immunity and
from the suggestion, developed in the prior Article in this series, that the effect of
the eleventh amendment was to ensconce the position that article III did not of its
own force abrogate immunity. Arguably, there is a fallacy in that thesis because
article III, standing alone, has been interpreted not to confer jurisdiction on the
inferior federal courts, but instead simply to allow jurisdiction of certain categories
of cases vhen Congress chooses to confer it. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850). One might think, therefore, that it is meaningless to suggest, as I do, that
article III itself does not remove immunity but that it allows Congress to do so.
It might seem meaningless, because the results of the two positions-article M
abrogation and article III nonabrogation-appear to be precisely the same: either
requires a congressional grant of jurisdiction over suits against states as a prerequisite
to jurisdiction, and either upholds jurisdiction when that grant is made.
Nonetheless, there are ways in which the abrogation and the nonabrogation
positions remain distinct. First, the two positions are clearly different as they relate
to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which extends to suits to which a state
is party, and which derives directly from the Constitution independent of any congressional grant of jurisdiction, Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 86
(1861), (although Congress may make it concurrent with the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts or of state courts, Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884); B36rs v.
Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884)). The original jurisdiction would therefore prima
face differ in scope depending upon whether article III was deemed to abrogate
immunity or simply to leave it, as a common law doctrine, subject to abrogation by
Congress.
More significantly, the seeming identity in results for the lower federal courts
of the abrogation and nonabrogation positions suggests that the nonabrogation position must require one very limited clear language rule for congressional enactments
to abrogate states' immunity: Since the nonabrogation position holds that article
III's extension of the judicial power to "Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State" does not in itself remove states' immunity, congressional
grants of jurisdiction in the same terms should similarly not be construed to confer
jurisdiction of suits against nonconsenting states. When Congress uses the constitutional language, or a close approximation thereof, to confer jurisdiction, it simply
allows federal courts to hear suits in which states are properly parties (i.e. those in
which the state is plaintiff, or in which the state has consented to suit). Federal
courts should not rule that Congress has opted to lift states' immunity when the
only evidence of that congressional purpose is Congress' use of the constitutional
language. (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), not only was in the
original jurisdiction. It also was brought under a grant of jurisdiction that would
be considered a "close approximation" of the constitutional language and therefore
insufficient to show a grant of jurisdiction in private suits against states today. It
was brought under § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80, which
provided: "The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens;
and except, also, between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.")
Perhaps the limited rule proposed should not be conceived of as a clear language requirement at all, for it is not an absolute. See text accompanying note 322
infra. In any event, that limited rule preserves the distinction between the abroga-
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Such a clear evidence requirement is consistent with a common
law approach to immunity; courts impose clear evidence requirements with some frequency. 812 In this context it could readily be
justified because important interests of federalism are at stake. Indeed, even if one opts for the more rigid rules of strict construction
that the Court and some commentators have advanced, instead of a
simple clear evidence requirement, it is not essential, in order to
support the rules, that sovereign immunity be regarded as a constitutionally imposed doctrine. Even apart from any sovereign immunity provisions in the Constitution, many policies counsel against
the judiciary readily finding implied causes of action against states.
The Edelman Court grounded upon the eleventh axpendment its
rule that the judiciary should not, in the absence of somewhat explicit congressional authorizaiton, find implied damage remedies
against the states, but traditional limits upon the judicial function in
conjunction with policies of federalism could support the rule as
well. Although it is not unheard of for federal courts to find implied damage remedies, the instances in which they have done so 313
are much more limited than for other forms of relief (principally
injunctive relief). 314 In fact, some Justices have even questioned
judicial power to find an implied damage remedy. 15 And "Our
Federalism" has led to a much greater reluctance to grant relief
against states than against other defendants, even when no sovereign
tion and nonabrogation positions in the lower federal courts, and independently, it
makes sense in terms of the historical understanding of the phrase "Controversies
... between a State and citizens of another State."
discussions of instances in which courts have imposed a requirement of
312For
"clear and convincing evidence" (or some variant formulation), see C.T. McComucK,
McCoR-ncx's HANDBooK OF T= LAw OF EvIDENcE 796-98 (2d ed. 1972); J.H.

WIcuoon,

A

TREATISE ON T=E ANGLo-AMERicAN SYSTEM OF EvrDENcE

Di

TnRus

329-34 (1940).
313 See notes 287 & 293 supra.
314 See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1109, 1158 (1969)
(It has been generally recognized that courts can find implied equitable remedies for
constitutional violations but the principle that they can do so "has been obscured
in regard to legal remedies, particularly the judgment for damages.").
315 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. 427 (Black, J., dissenting); id.
430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see id. 398 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); notes 287 & 293 supra. Moreover, at common law, courts created damage
AT CoMMoN LAw

remedies, along with others, as a matter of course.

See generally T. Ptucm-qSr,

A CONcISE HISTORY OF Tm COMMON LAw (5th ed. 1956); Katz, The Jurisprudence
of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1968).
Moreover, even when a damage remedy is explicitly provided, there are bases
other than sovereign immunity that sometimes make it inappropriate for monetary
relief to be retroactive as well. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 46 U.S.L.W.
4347, 4351-53 (U.S. S. Ct., April 25, 1978).
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immunity policy is at stake. 31 6 The same policies could be invoked
in support of the Court's somewhat amorphous "clear language" approach. And while I have indicated I do not think a strictly-defined
"clear statement" requirement should be imposed absent doubts
concerning the propriety or constitutional validity of a congressional
enactment, a deep sense of hostility to suits against states could lead
one to use these doctrines to devise such a rule, even if the Constitution as such does not stand behind the sovereign immunity doctrine.
C. Summary

I

the final analysis, there are to date only three discernible

rules flowing from the Court's constitutionalization of sovereign im-

munity: Federal courts should not rule that constitutional provisions
-at least the contract clause 3 17-remove states' immunity of their
own force; courts may not find an implied damage remedy against
states absent statutory language that literally includes states as potential defendants; and in some cases 318 there must as well be "clear

language" specifically reflecting a purpose to lift states' immunity
from suit. I woud suggest that the first of these rules be viewed as
resulting not from the eleventh amendment but from an interpretation of the contract clause, and perhaps all or most other preeleventh amendment constitutional provisions-an interpretation
that is supported by the general understanding of the scope of those

provisions when they were adopted. I would also suggest that a clear
316E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), holding that federal courts
should not interfere in pending state criminal proceedings. This policy of noninterference has been followed despite the fact that such cases are outside the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972). Furthermore, the policy has recently been extended to prohibit federal
interference with civil enforcement proceedings instituted by states. E.g., Juidice
v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S.Ct. 1200 (1975).
Similarly, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), may not
be tied to any specific constitutional provision, see note 82 supra, and illustrates
federal reluctance to impose upon states. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 499-503 (1974) (dictum); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)
("[W]here as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal
courts must be constantly mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be
preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own
law."'); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court).
31
7Or perhaps the category is all constitutional provisions predating the
eleventh amendment

See notes 286-88 supra & accompanying text.

318 E.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See text accompanying notes 220-32
supra.
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evidence rule supplant the Court's rules generally limiting judicial
discovery of causes of action against states. But even if the Court's
more specific limitations on the judiciary are deemed preferable,
they can be maintained under the interpretation of the eleventh
amendment that the historical materials suggest to be correct-that
sovereign immunity is an established common law doctrine, but is
not constitutionally required.
The three rules that the Court has derived from its constitutional immunity doctrine can be explained on a theory that the
eleventh amendment was not intended to limit the Congress, but
only the judiciary. Indeed, the three rules can be stated as one:
The judiciary may not find implied causes of action against states.3 19
I prefer the view that the eleventh amendment was not intended to
limit either Congress or the judiciary. There is, however, one specific rule of limitation that unquestionably does flow from the
eleventh amendment: This is the rule that article III should not be
interpreted to abrogate immunity of its own force 82 0 That rule, in
my view, states the full effect of the eleventh amendment. It can,
however, be given a broad or a narrow scope. It can be understood,
for example, to support the position that no provision in the original
Constitution should be deemed to abrogate immunity of its own
force.32 1 Moreover, as a corollary to the rule that article III does
not abrogate immunity, congressional grants of jurisdiction expressed
simply in the words of article III should not be interpreted to abrogate sovereign immunity; other clear evidence that Congress had
intended, in those grants of jurisdiction, to confer jurisdiction of
private suits against states would be necessary for jurisdiction to be
found.32 2
319 Injunctive relief, and some other specific relief, is still allowed, on a
rationale that such suits are against individual officers, not against the state. Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).

The proposition in text accurately states the Court's approach, if Hans v.
Louisiana is deemed to stand for the broad proposition that the judiciary may not
find causes of action against states implied in constitutional provisions. The other
two rules are counterparts to the Hans rule, applicable to statutory provisions: (1)
The judiciary should not find implied causes of action for retroactive monetary benefits against states (the Edeman rule); (2) A possible rule that the judiciary may
not find that Congress has authorized suit against states in the absence of clear
language abrogating states' immunity. This Last rule, attempting to separate
"implied" causes of action from those that Congress has granted, is only a possibility

because it may apply only to enactments that have in any event been invalidated by
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); or it may apply only to

enactments whose constitutionality the Court doubts.
320

See Part One, supra note 1, at 536-39.

321
3 22

See note 286 supra and text accompanying notes 283-89 supra.
For a full discussion of this point, see note 311 supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Court's position on sovereign immunity is essentially that
Congress is free to impose suit upon the states but that the judiciary
should show restraint in finding implied remedies against state. The
Court has derived its complex of sovereign immunity rules from the
eleventh amendment, which it views as creating a constitutional requirement of sovereign immunity. The distortions that have been
imposed upon the language of the eleventh amendment from the
outset in order for it to support a workable and appropriate sovereign immunity doctrine are evidence that an erroneous view 0of
the amendment has prevailed. In some respects states' immunity
has been interpreted more broadly than the constitutional language
would suggest. Two examples are the rule that sovereign immunity
exists in citizen and noncitizen suits alike, although the amendment
in terms covers only noncitizen suits; and the rule that jurisdiction
exists once a state consents to suit, although the amendment purports to state a limit upon the federal judicial power. In other respects it has been interpreted more narrowly-for example the
exclusion from immunity of suits seeking injunctions against unconstitutional conduct.
The Court's failure to follow constitutional language suggests
that sovereign immunity has lost its constitutional moorings. Moreover, it requires confusing, convoluted, and essentially disingenuous
reasoning to support the Court's position that Congress is free to
override the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity (in most
situations at least and perhaps invariably). That reasoning might
be dangerous as well, if it were deemed to carry over to true constitutional guarantees.
Historical materials suggest that the correct interpretation is
that the established doctrine of sovereign immunity survived the
adoption of the Constitution and of the eleventh amendment, but
that the doctrine is not constitutionally required. This approach
leads to results very similar to those the Court has adopted, but they
flow much more readily and directly from a common law view of
immunity: Because states' sovereign immunity is not a constitutionally required principle, of course Congress can modify it (acting
within the scope of its affirmative powers) 323 and the federal judiciary can develop it generally in accordance with its usual principles
323 The difficulties with the application of the same principles for both citizen
and noncitizen suits, as well as with jurisdiction attaching upon consent to suit,
are also removed.
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for common law development 32 4 (principles which themselves often
counsel restraint, especially in areas important to the viability of
state sovereignties and to the federal-state balance of power).
This approach accords with the history. It continues the results
the Court has labored so hard to reach under a constitutional view
of the immunity, and it fits with the eleventh amendment's language. 32 5 Surely it is preferable to arrive directly at these results by
following the theory of the eleventh amendment allowing modification of sovereign immunity by usual common law processes, than
to overread and underread the eleventh amendment's language as
the Court's own approach has forced it to do. The Court should
take another look at the underpinnings of the eleventh amendment
and discover the clear evidence that exists in history that article III
and the eleventh amendment leave sovereign immunity in the status
of an established common law doctrine.
324 Subject, perhaps, to a clear evidence rule together with a special rule that
congressional grants of jurisdiction phrased in article III language, or a close
approximation thereof, should not be deemed sufficient to abrogate states' immunity.
See note 311 supra.
325 See Part One, supra note 1, at 543-44.

